

Zero Emission Standard



ILLINOIS POWER AGENCY

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ZERO EMISSION STANDARD PROCUREMENT PLAN

~~DRAFT PLAN FOR PUBLIC COMMENT~~

FILED FOR ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION APPROVAL

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Illinois Power Agency Act (20 ILCS 3855) and Public Act 99-0906

Table of Contents

1	Introduction.....	1
1.1	Plan Organization.....	1
1.2	Action Plan.....	2
2	Legislative Overview.....	3
2.1	Illinois Power Agency Authority.....	3
2.2	Renewable Energy Resource Procurement.....	5
2.3	House Resolution 1146, Public Act 99-0906, and the Zero Emission Standard.....	7
2.4	ZEC Procurement Plan Development Timeline.....	9
3	Plan Development and Procurement Requirements.....	12
3.1	Zero Emission Facilities and Zero Emission Credits.....	12
3.2	Requirements of the Plan.....	14
3.3	ZEC Procurement Contracts.....	15
3.4	ZEC Pricing.....	17
3.5	ZEC Procurement Cost Cap.....	18
3.6	ZEC Procurement Process Overview.....	21
4	ZEC Price, Volumes and Cost Cap Determination.....	23
4.1	Social Cost of Carbon.....	23
4.2	Baseline Market Price Index.....	23
4.3	Market Price Index.....	24
4.4	ZEC Price Calculation.....	25
4.5	ZEC Contractual Volume.....	27
4.6	ZEC Cost Cap.....	29
4.7	ZEC Volume Cap.....	31
5	Bid Evaluation and Selection.....	33
5.1	Public Interest Criteria.....	33
5.2	Bid Scoring and Selection.....	36
5.2.1	CO ₂ Scoring.....	44
5.2.2	NO _x , SO ₂ , PM _{2.5} , and PM ₁₀ Scoring.....	47
5.3	Incremental Environmental Benefits Preserved.....	50
5.3.1	Risk Based Multiplier.....	50
5.3.2	Economic Stress Multiplier.....	52
5.4	Scoring Calculation.....	54

6	Procurement Process Administration.....	58
6.1	Bidder Qualification.....	58
6.2	Procurement Process.....	60
6.3	Commission Approval of Procurement Results.....	61
6.4	ZEC Contracts.....	63
6.4.1	Contract Suspension or Termination.....	64
6.4.2	Six Year Review of Actual ZEC Payments.....	64
6.5	Tracking ZECs.....	65
1	Introduction.....	1
1.1	Plan Organization.....	1
1.2	Action Plan.....	2
2	Legislative Overview.....	3
2.1	Illinois Power Agency Authority.....	3
2.2	Renewable Energy Resource Procurement.....	5
2.3	House Resolution 1146, Public Act 99-0906, and the Zero Emission Standard.....	7
2.4	ZEC Procurement Plan Development Timeline.....	9
3	Plan Development and Procurement Requirements.....	12
3.1	Zero Emission Facilities and Zero Emission Credits.....	12
3.2	Requirements of the Plan.....	14
3.3	ZEC Procurement Contracts.....	15
3.4	ZEC Pricing.....	17
3.5	ZEC Procurement Cost Cap.....	18
3.6	ZEC Procurement Process Overview.....	21
4	ZEC Price, Volumes and Cost Cap Determination.....	23
4.1	Social Cost of Carbon.....	23
4.2	Baseline Market Price Index.....	23
4.3	Market Price Index.....	24
4.4	ZEC Price Calculation.....	25
4.5	ZEC Contractual Volume.....	27
4.6	ZEC Cost Cap.....	29
4.7	ZEC Volume Cap.....	31
5	Bid Evaluation and Selection.....	33

5.1	Public Interest Criteria	33
5.2	Bid Scoring and Selection.....	36
5.2.1	Non-CO ₂ Emissions Scoring Metrics.....	38
5.2.2	CO ₂ Scoring	44
5.3	Incremental Environmental Benefits Preserved.....	47
5.3.1	Economic Stress Multiplier.....	50
5.3.2	Rate-based Facilities	55
5.4	Scoring Calculation.....	56
6	Procurement Process Administration.....	58
6.1	Bidder Qualification.....	58
6.2	Procurement Process	60
6.3	Commission Approval of Procurement Results	61
6.4	ZEC Contracts.....	63
6.4.1	Contract Suspension or Termination.....	64
6.4.2	Six Year Review of Actual ZEC Payments	64
6.5	Tracking ZECs	65

Appendix A ZEC Cost Workbook

Appendix B Utility Data Responses

Appendix C Wind Direction and Distance Factors

Appendix D MISO & PJM Nuclear Facility Summer Rated Capacity

Appendix E Bid Evaluation Form

Appendix F Bidder Eligibility Form

Appendix G Procurement Process Applicability Comparison (Section 16-111.5)

Appendix H Legislative Compliance Index

1 Introduction

Public Act 99-0906, which took effect on June 1, 2017, created a new subsection of the Illinois Power Agency Act; Section 1-75(d-5), known as the Zero Emission Standard. This Standard requires the Illinois Power Agency (“IPA” or “Agency”) to create this Zero Emission Standard Procurement Plan. This Plan sets out the provisions for the procurement of Zero Emission Credits from Zero Emission Facilities. These credits recognize the environmental benefits of certain electric generation resources that do not emit carbon dioxide or other key pollutants.

One of Public Act 99-0906’s legislative findings was a declaration that “[r]educing emissions of carbon dioxide and other air pollutants, such as sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter, is critical to improving air quality in Illinois for Illinois residents,” and that, as a result, “... Illinois must expand its commitment to zero emission generation and value the environmental attributes of zero emission generation that currently falls outside the scope of the existing renewable portfolio standard, including, but not limited to, nuclear power.” With regard to existing zero emission facilities, the legislature found that “[p]reserving existing zero emission energy generation and promoting new zero emission energy generation is vital to placing the State on a glide path to achieving its environmental goals and ensuring that air quality in Illinois continues to improve.”

To best achieve these goals, the General Assembly found that “it is necessary to establish and implement a zero emission standard, which will increase the State’s reliance on zero emission energy through the procurement of zero emission credits from zero emission facilities, in order to achieve the State’s environmental objectives and reduce the adverse impact of emitted air pollutants on the health and welfare of the State’s citizens.” To this end, Public Act 99-0906 established a new subsection 1-75(d-5) of the IPA Act, creating a Zero Emission Standard and requiring the IPA to develop this Zero Emission Standard Plan setting forth its approach for ensuring compliance with that standard.

1.1 Plan Organization

The Plan contains the following Chapters:

Chapter 1 is this Introduction. It contains a brief summary of the Chapters of this Plan as well as an Action Plan for specific items that the Illinois Power Agency requests that the Illinois Commerce Commission approve as part of the approval of this Plan.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of legislative background for the newly enacted Section 1-75(d-5) of the Illinois Power Agency Act.

Chapter 3 describes the Plan development and procurement requirements. This chapter outlines the approach for how ZECs are priced and the timeline for plan development and approval.

Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of the Social Price of Carbon, Baseline Market Price Index, Market Price Index, ZEC Price, ZEC contractual volumes, ZEC cost cap, and ZEC volume cap.

Chapter 5 covers Bid Evaluation and Selection. It describes how the public interest criteria are applied, the weighting of scores, and the methodology applicable to CO₂, NO_x, SO₂, and Particulate Matter.

Chapter 6 describes the Procurement Process itself. This includes a discussion of the practicability of the application of the provisions of Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act to the procurement process, bidder qualification, the procurement process itself, ZEC contract development, and ZEC tracking.

Appendices to this Plan provide more detailed data and calculations, as well as a draft template for the Bidder Eligibility Application Form.

1.2 Action Plan

In approving this Plan, the Agency requests the following Action Items be explicitly approved by the Commission.

1. A finding that this Plan will result in the procurement of cost-effective zero emission credits.
2. Approval of the calculations contained in Chapter 4.
3. Approval of the Bid Evaluation and Selection methodology contained in Chapter 5.
4. Approval of the Procurement Process, timeline, and provisions as described in Chapter 6, including the summary of the applicability of Section 16-111.5 provisions to the procurement process as contained in Appendix G.
5. Approval of the use of Emission Free Energy Certificates as tracked in the PJM Generation Attribute Tracking System as the means for tracking the generation, transfer, and retirement of Zero Emission Credits.
6. Approval of the ~~Bid~~Bidder Eligibility form contained in Appendix ~~EF~~.

~~The~~ Consistent with the requirements of Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C) of the Illinois Power Agency Act, ~~the~~ Illinois Power Agency respectfully publishes files this Zero Emission Standard Procurement Plan, for review and ~~invites interested parties to submit comments on the Plan to the Agency~~ approval by ~~July 21, 2017~~ the Illinois Commerce Commission.

2 Legislative Overview

This Chapter of the 2017 Zero Emission Standard Procurement Plan (“Plan”), as well as the Chapter that follows, describe the legislative background and requirements applicable to the Illinois Power Agency that are applicable to the development of the Illinois Power Agency’s Plan to procure zero emission credits (“ZECs”). Chapter 2 (Legislative Overview) provides background on the Agency and its process for developing procurement plans and conducting procurement events more generally, while Chapter 3 (Zero Emission Standard Plan Development and Procurement Requirements) focuses on issues specific to the state’s new Zero Emission Standard (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)).

2.1 Illinois Power Agency Authority

The Illinois Power Agency (“IPA” or “Agency”) was established in 2007 through omnibus energy legislation ultimately enacted as Public Act 95-0481. Not unlike the recently enacted Public Act 99-0906, Public Act 95-0481 touched on many aspects of energy sector’s legal and regulatory structure and instituted major energy reforms into Illinois law, including a new electricity procurement process to serve eligible retail customers, the establishment of state’s initial Renewable Portfolio Standard to support renewable energy generation (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(c)), the Clean Coal Portfolio Standard (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d)), and the Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (220 ILCS 5/8-103), and, more broadly, the establishment of the Illinois Power Agency Act (“IPA Act”), 20 ILCS 3855.

As evident in the IPA Act itself, in creating the Agency, the General Assembly found that Illinois citizens should be provided “adequate, reliable, affordable, efficient, and environmentally-sustainable electric service at the lowest total cost over time, taking into account benefits of price stability.”¹ Thus, one primary purpose of the IPA Act, and in turn the creation of the Agency, was to ensure that ratepayers, specifically customers in service classes that had not been declared competitive and who take service under a utility’s bundled rate (“eligible retail customers”),² benefit from retail and wholesale competition. A primary objective for creating the Agency was therefore to improve the process to procure electricity and other standard wholesale products for those customers.³

As initially conceived, the Agency’s primary responsibility concerned developing procurement plans and conducting competitive procurement events to help the state’s large investor-owned

¹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-5(1).

² 220 ILCS 5/16-111.5(a).

³ 20 ILCS 3855/1-5(2)-(4).

electric utilities meet the supply requirements of those entities' "eligible retail customers," i.e., those customers who continued to receive supply service from their utility even as the competitive supply market developed in Illinois.⁴ As set forth in Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act ("PUA"), the Agency's process for meeting those requirements begins with the receipt of load forecasts from the utilities themselves each year by July 15, with the IPA and its procurement planning consultant then having 30 days to draft and publish an annual "procurement plan" setting forth its proposed strategy for conducting procurements to bring necessary "standard wholesale products" (i.e., block energy, capacity, ancillary services, etc.) under utility contract. After comments are received on the draft procurement plan, that plan is revised and filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC" or "Commission") for approval through a formal docketed notice and comment proceeding.⁵

After Commission approval of an IPA Procurement Plan, the Agency then works with its Procurement Administrator⁶ to prepare for and conduct the procurement events proposed in the Plan and authorized through the Commission's Order approving the Plan. The results of those procurement events likewise require Commission approval, with the Commission receiving confidential reports from both its Procurement Monitor⁷ and the IPA's Procurement Administrator to inform its approval of the Procurement Administrator's selection of winning bids. Shortly after the Commission's approval of procurement results, standard form supply contracts are executed between winning suppliers and the utilities whose supply requirements were met through the procurement event.

⁴ Public Act 95-0541 also required the development of an IPA Resource Development Bureau for potentially constructing and operating electric generating facilities to meet the load requirements of municipal electric systems, governmental aggregators, or rural electric cooperatives in Illinois. As this function has proven unnecessary or unwise to undertake, the Agency has never established a Resource Development Bureau, and in 2016 the Illinois General Assembly amended the IPA Act to ensure that the establishment of that Bureau was a permissive ("may establish") and not prescriptive ("shall establish") requirement.

⁵ Since 2009, the IPA has each year developed an annual procurement plan and (except for in 2013) conducted competitive procurements to meet the needs of the eligible retail customers of Ameren and ComEd. Beginning in 2016, MidAmerican Energy elected to participate in the IPA's planning and procurement process to serve a portion of its load requirements for its eligible customers in Illinois.

⁶ The Procurement Administrator is a third-party consultant mandated pursuant to Section 1-75(a)(2) of the IPA Act to be retained by the IPA in order to conduct the Agency's competitive procurement processes. The Agency's current Procurement Administrator is NERA Economic Consulting.

⁷ The Procurement Monitor is a consultant retained by the Commission pursuant to Section 16-111.5(c)(2) of the PUA to monitor and review all aspects of the Agency's procurement processes. The Commission's current Procurement Monitor is Bates White, LLC.

2.2 Renewable Energy Resource Procurement

In establishing the IPA, the General Assembly also acknowledged the importance of including cost-effective renewable resources as part of a “diverse electricity supply portfolio” that provided “environmentally sustainable electric service,” with an aim of “decreasing environmental impacts” and “avoiding or delaying the need for new generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure.”⁸ This informed enactment of the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, or “RPS.” The state’s original RPS required that the above-referenced process be used to bring under contract environmental attributes of generation (known as “renewable energy resources,” which may be met through renewable energy credits, or “RECs”).⁹

Not unlike the Zero Emission Standard (discussed in more detail in the Chapters to follow, as well as Section 2.3 below), the RPS established percentage-based procurement targets for ensuring that utilities’ eligible retail customer load was met through an annually-increasing percentage of renewable energy credits. Consistent with the requirements of Section 1-75(c) of the IPA Act and Section 16-111.5 of the PUA, procurement events to procure those RECs were proposed as part of the Agency’s annual procurement plan. The results of approved procurement events were likewise subject to Commission approval, with winning suppliers of RECs and the utilities’ whose RPS requirements were met through the REC procurement required to execute standard form supply contracts shortly after the approval of procurement results.

As with the Zero Emission Standard, RPS spending was (and continues to be) subject to the limitations of a rate impact cap. Amounts that could be recovered from eligible retail customers to fund RPS procurements were limited to “no more than the greater of 2.015% of the amount paid per kilowatthour by [eligible retail] customers during the year ending May 31, 2007 or the incremental amount per kilowatthour paid for these resources in 2011,” resulting in the establishment of a budget cap as this value was multiplied against previously-supplied utility load. Purchases that would cause that cap to be exceeded would not be authorized, even if such purchases were necessary to meet the percentage-based procurement targets found in the RPS.¹⁰

⁸ 20 ILCS 3855/1-5(5), (6).

⁹ Under revisions to the RPS brought about by Public Act 99-0906, meeting the state’s RPS requirements now requires the development of a separate “long-term renewable resources plan,” with only the “initial forward procurements” and “competitive procurement events” subject to the specific procurement process requirements of Section 16-111.5(e) of the PUA (instead, for projects such as solar photovoltaic distributed generation and “community solar,” a more rolling and open-ended project proposal and selection process known as an “adjustable block program” featuring administratively established REC prices applies).

¹⁰ Long-term renewable resources contracts approved as part of the 2010 procurement cycle also included curtailment provision to ensure that the rate impact cap was not exceeded. Those provisions were invoked for ComEd’s contracts in 2013 and 2014.

As referenced above, Public Act 99-0906 also brought about significant reforms to the Illinois RPS. Perhaps the most important reform concerns transitioning from different RPS requirements based on supply source – while the IPA developed plans and conducted procurement events to meet *eligible retail customer* RPS requirements, alternative retail electric suppliers were subject to very different requirements¹¹ — to a model through which the RPS budget is established through a delivery service charge applied to all retail customers, regardless of supply source, with procurement targets applicable to retail customer (and not merely *eligible* retail customer, i.e., utility supply) load. In this respect, the RPS is being brought into alignment with the newly-enacted ZES, which likewise features targets based on retail customer load funded through a charge applicable to all retail customers (and which likewise is subject to the development of a separate procurement plan).

This overview of the Agency’s historical renewable resources procurement process and obligations demonstrates that the Agency’s role in developing procurement plans and conducting procurement events to meet statutory targets for the environmental attributes of electric generation is not a new one, nor is the Commission’s role in adjudicating the review of those plans and approving the results of environmental attribute procurement events.¹² Likewise, requirements that the Agency develop plans and conduct procurements of environmental attributes consistent with its “standard wholesale product” procurement requirements found in Section 16-111.5 of the PUA are not new either. The Agency perhaps has more latitude and different structures to apply to renewable energy resource procurements *after* the passage of Public Act 99-0906 than before, but the vast majority of its renewable resource procurements to date have followed the strictures of Section 16-111.5 of the PUA—as the procurement of zero emission credits will in large part as well, further explained in Chapter 3 below and Appendix G. Thus, where possible, the Agency has drawn upon its prior lessons learned from planning and conducting *renewable energy credit* procurements in developing this Zero Emission Standard Plan for the procurement of *zero emission credits*. Procedural specifics regarding the procurement process for zero emission credits can be found in Chapter 3 below, with key elements of that process explained in further detail in Chapters that follow.

¹¹ See 220 ILCS 5/16-115D.

¹² Indeed, through the Agency’s Supplemental Photovoltaic (“SPV”) procurement process (authorized by 20 ILCS 3855/1-56(i), enacted through Public Act 98-0672), the Agency even has experience developing a standalone plan for the procurement of environmental attributes only from a specific type of underlying generation—in that case, renewable energy credits from “new” solar photovoltaic distributed generation systems. (See generally Docket No. 14-0651 approving the IPA’s SPV Plan).

2.3 House Resolution 1146, Public Act 99-0906, and the Zero Emission Standard

As referenced above, Public Act 99-0906 introduced a series of reforms to the Illinois energy statutory and regulatory landscape. Among them included the expansion of targets found in the state's energy efficiency portfolio standard,¹³ many changes to the state's renewable energy portfolio standard (some of which are referenced above) including the establishment of the Illinois Solar for All low-income solar program,¹⁴ new bill crediting/offset provisions for community solar project subscriptions,¹⁵ the institution of a new \$250-per-kilowatt distributed generation rebate for new photovoltaic systems featuring a smart inverter,¹⁶ and the establishment of a zero emission standard intended to support the environmental attributes of nuclear power generation.¹⁷

While providing nuclear generating units with some compensation for the value of their emission-free environmental attributes has long been a part of energy policy discussions (including any discussions around the institution of a carbon tax or the implementation of a "cap and trade" system for emissions credits), concrete discussions around how such a mechanism could be best implemented through Illinois law began in earnest in 2014. At that time, in response to concerns that certain nuclear power plants were at risk of closure due to market conditions that adversely affected the ongoing commercial viability of these plants, the Illinois House of Representatives adopted House Resolution 1146 of the 98th General Assembly ("HR 1146"). That resolution—specifically referenced in Section 1.5(5)-(8) of the Legislative Findings to Public Act 99-0906, and also mentioned in reference to the public interest bid selection criteria found in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C) of the Zero Emission Standard—contained a series of statements regarding the value of nuclear power generation and urged several state agencies, including the IPA, to prepare reports concerning the impacts of premature closure of these plants, with each report topic (taken broadly: cost, reliability, environmental impacts, and economic benefits) assigned to the agency with presumed expertise. HR 1146 concluded with a request that the findings in those reports "include potential market-based solutions that will ensure that the premature closure of these nuclear power plants does not occur and that the dire consequences to the economy, jobs, and the environment are averted."¹⁸

Those reports prepared by the ICC, the IPA, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, and the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity in response to HR 1146 were

¹³ See generally 220 ILCS 5/8-103B.

¹⁴ See generally 20 ICLS 3855/1-56, 1-75(c).

¹⁵ See generally 220 ILCS 5/16-107.5.

¹⁶ See generally 220 ILCS 5/16-107.6.

¹⁷ See generally 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5).

¹⁸ For reference, a copy of HR 1146 can be found here: <http://ilga.gov/legislation/98/HR/PDF/09800HR1146lv.pdf>

published on January 5, 2015.¹⁹ Overall, those reports focused on identifying the potential impacts that could result from the premature closure of three specific Illinois-based nuclear generating facilities that were identified across the agencies as being “at risk.”²⁰ The reports concluded with a section identifying and discussing various “market-based solutions” that could be adopted by the state.

The time between the publishing of the HR 1146 reports to the passage of what became amendments to SB 2814 in the Illinois General Assembly (and then Public Act 99-0906 once signed into law by the Governor) was roughly 23 months, and the long list of legislative proposals offered during that time span, as well as the many committee hearings exploring the subjects eventually addressed through that bill, need not be recounted here. The process was comprehensive and exhaustive, and the Agency presumes that whatever specific factors motivated lawmakers to enact this particular market-based solution through the form represented by Public Act 99-0906 is, to the extent relevant, properly captured through the plain language of the Act’s text, the Act’s legislative findings, and other legislative history accompanying its enactment.

In that vein, among Public Act 99-0906’s legislative findings was a declaration that “[r]educing emissions of carbon dioxide and other air pollutants, such as sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter, is critical to improving air quality in Illinois for Illinois residents,” and that, as a result, “... Illinois must expand its commitment to zero emission generation and value the environmental attributes of zero emission generation that currently falls outside the scope of the existing renewable portfolio standard, including, but not limited to, nuclear power.”²¹ With regard to existing zero emission facilities, the legislature found that “[p]reserving existing zero emission energy generation and promoting new zero emission energy generation is vital to placing the State on a glide path to achieving its environmental goals and ensuring that air quality in Illinois continues to improve.”²²

¹⁹ A copy of the HR 1146 reports, as well as a brief summary, may be found on the website of the Illinois Commerce Commission at: www.icc.illinois.gov/electricity/workshops/hr1146.aspx.

²⁰ Perhaps of particular significance given the focus on environmental benefits in the legislative findings accompanying Public Act 99-0906 was the projected loss of environmental attributes associated with these zero emission facilities. As discussed in the Illinois EPA’s contribution to the HR 1146 report, a substantial portion of the generation necessary to replace the output from the zero emission facilities could very well be sourced from fossil fuel generating units, which would not preserve the beneficial environmental attributes associated with the at-risk zero emission nuclear facilities.

²¹ P.A. 99-0906, Zero Emission Standard Legislative Findings (Section 1.5).

²² Id.

To best achieve these goals, the General Assembly found that “it is necessary to establish and implement a zero emission standard, which will increase the State’s reliance on zero emission energy through the procurement of zero emission credits from zero emission facilities, in order to achieve the State’s environmental objectives and reduce the adverse impact of emitted air pollutants on the health and welfare of the State’s citizens.”²³ To this end, Public Act 99-0906 established a new subsection 1-75(d-5) of the IPA Act, creating a Zero Emission Standard and requiring the IPA to develop a Zero Emission Standard Plan setting forth its plan for ensuring compliance with that standard.

2.4 ZEC Procurement Plan Development Timeline

Although Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C-5) of the IPA Act envisions that the entire ZEC procurement process – including the execution of ZEC delivery contracts – “shall be completed no later than May 10, 2017,” the effective date of Public Act 99-0906 was June 1, 2017, leaving the implementing agencies (the IPA and ICC) without authority to meet the requirements of the statute until after that date had passed. Subparagraph (C-5) also provides, however, that the IPA and ICC “may, as appropriate, modify the various dates and timelines” outlined in the Act “[b]ased on the effective date” of the Act.²⁴ With an effective date of June 1, 2017, the IPA thus understands that any statutory deadlines will extend from the timelines tracking against the actual effective date of Public Act 99-0906 as set forth in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C) of the IPA Act, with other due dates and timelines subject to modification as well. This Section describes that revised timeline.²⁵

Under that approach, the IPA ~~is~~ was required to publish a draft Zero Emission Standard Procurement Plan within 45 days of June 1, 2017, the effective date of the Act.²⁶ Copies of the draft plan were published and posted on the IPA’s website on July 11, 2017, slightly ahead of its statutory deadline.²⁷ Interested parties ~~are~~ were allowed 10 days from the date of that publishing to provide comments on the draft Plan.²⁸ Comments were received from Ameren Illinois Company,

²³ Id.

²⁴ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C-5).

²⁵ The Act also states that “[n]otwithstanding whether a procurement event is conducted under Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act, the Agency shall immediately initiate a procurement process on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly.” (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C-5). The Agency believes that by having begun the development of its Zero Emission Standard Plan on the effective date of Public Act 99-0906, it has satisfied this criteria.

²⁶ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

²⁷ After application of the statute on statutes (See 5 ILCS 70/1.11), the 45-day deadline for publishing the draft Plan ~~is~~ was technically July 17, 2017, taking into account that the 45th day falls on a weekend (Saturday July 15).

²⁸ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C). Parties ~~have~~ had until July 21, 2017 to provide comments on the draft ZES Plan.

~~Exelon Generation, the Staff of the Illinois Commerce Commission, the Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers, and Invenergy LLC. Those public comments will be~~ posted on the IPA’s website, ~~and to the extent possible, the IPA requests that such comments “be specific, supported by data or other detailed analyses, and, if objecting to all or a portion of the procurement plan, accompanied by specific alternative wording or proposals” consistent with Section 16-111.5(d)(2) of the PUA.~~²⁹

After the end of the draft Plan comment period on July 21, 2017, and consistent with the statutory 60 day deadline from the effective date of the Act, the IPA ~~will review the comments submitted and may, to the extent justified by~~ reviewed the comments received, ~~revise and~~ revised the Plan. ~~The accordingly. This revised-draft Plan will be~~ was filed with the ICC ~~no later than~~ on July 31, 2017.³⁰

The Act provides the Commission with 45 days to review the filed Plan ~~and determine if the Plan would result in the cost effective procurement of ZECs.~~³¹ After ~~that~~ “notice and comment proceeding, hearing,” should the Commission determine that the Plan would result in the cost effective³² procurement of ZECs, “then the Commission shall . . . approve the plan or approve with modification.”³³

~~Should~~ Since the Agency ~~file its~~ filed this Zero Emission Standard Plan with the Commission on July 31, 2017 ~~(as it currently plans to do), this would leave, this leaves~~ the Commission with an approval deadline of September ~~15~~ 14, 2017. At present, the Commission has a Special Open Meeting scheduled for September, 11, 2017.

Once the Plan is approved (or approved with modification) by the Commission, the Agency, through its Procurement Administrator, will proceed with conducting the process described in Chapter 5 to procure 10-year contracts for ZECs.

In addition, after this Plan is approved (or approved with modification) by the Commission, the IPA will request that bidders interested in participating who own facilities meeting the definition

²⁹ Comments on the draft Plan may be found here: <https://www.illinois.gov/sites/ipa/Pages/Plans-Under-Development-Comments.aspx>

³⁰ July 30, 2017, the 60-day deadline established by the statute, falls on a Sunday.

³¹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

³² For the purposes of this Plan, the Act defines “cost effective” as meaning that “the projected costs of procuring zero emission credits from zero emission facilities do not cause the limit stated in paragraph (2) of this subsection to be exceeded.” That limitation is discussed further in Section 4.6 below, but generally means that the ZEC procurement cost does not exceed 1.65% of the per kilowatt hour rate paid by eligible retail customers during the year ending May 31, 2009 multiplied against retail customer load.

³³ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

of a zero emission facility under the Act submit the prescribed eligibility information. Interested bidders will have 14 days to submit the required eligibility information and become qualified bidders.³⁴ Additional information regarding the eligibility information to be provided to the IPA by potential bidders is described in Chapter 6.

³⁴ A draft template for this information is contained in Appendix F.

3 Plan Development and Procurement Requirements

As discussed in Chapter 2, IPA procurements begin with the publishing of a procurement plan over which comment is taken, progress to ~~a notice and comment hearing for docketed proceeding for approval of~~ that plan before the Illinois Commerce Commission, and culminate in a procurement event used to bring procured resources under contract. Section 1-75(d-5) of the IPA Act directs the IPA to develop and publish its plan for when and how to procure ZECs from qualifying zero emission facilities:³⁵ and submit that ZES Plan with the Commission for approval.³⁶

This Chapter discusses both key required elements of the Zero Emission Standard Plan itself as well as necessarily elements of the Zero Emission Credit procurement process and procurement event required to bring those ZECs under contract.

3.1 Zero Emission Facilities and Zero Emission Credits

Nuclear power plants generate electricity without the air pollutant emissions that result from the combustion of fuels to generate electricity. In most states—including under Illinois law—these

³⁵ ~~See generally 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C). While the Zero Emission Standard is less express than other parts of the IPA Act about the staging of a procurement event separate from the underlying plan's development and approval, the need for a subsequent procurement event stemming from the plan may be inferred from the various requirements of the plan itself, which describe how a separate "selection of winning bids" is to be conducted with a report from the Illinois Commerce Commission accompanying its "review and acceptance or rejection of the procurement results," rather than through its Order approving the plan. This two-stage "plan-then-procurement" process, which is consistent with other procurement plans that have been developed by the Agency, is further supported by a statement in subparagraph (C-5) that the "procurement and plan approval processes . . . shall be conducted in conjunction with the procurement and plan approval processes required by subsection (c) of [Section 1-75] and Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act, to the extent practicable." Under the Section 16-111.5 process, supply contracts can only be developed after administrative approval of the plan setting forth key elements associated with those contracts, necessitating that a procurement event be conducted only after the underlying plan is finalized and approved.~~

³⁶ See generally 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C). While the Zero Emission Standard is less express than other parts of the IPA Act about the staging of a procurement event separate from the underlying plan's development and approval, the need for a subsequent procurement event stemming from the plan may be inferred from the various requirements of the plan itself, which describe how a separate "selection of winning bids" is to be conducted with a report from the Illinois Commerce Commission accompanying its "review and acceptance or rejection of the procurement results," rather than through its Order approving the plan. This two-stage "plan-then-procurement" process, which is consistent with other procurement plans that have been developed by the Agency, is further supported by a statement in subparagraph (C-5) that the "procurement and plan approval processes . . . shall be conducted in conjunction with the procurement and plan approval processes required by subsection (c) of [Section 1-75] and Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act, to the extent practicable." Under the Section 16-111.5 process, supply contracts can only be developed after administrative approval of the plan setting forth key elements associated with those contracts, necessitating that a procurement event be conducted only after the underlying plan is finalized and approved.

nuclear power generating facilities are not considered to be “renewable” resources and therefore are not eligible to produce RECs. As a consequence, they cannot be used to meet state renewable energy resource procurement targets, such as the Illinois RPS, leaving them without a mechanism to receive value for the zero emission attributes associated with their generation. To recognize the zero emission value of nuclear generation, ZECs represent the environmental attributes from these zero emission facilities that would not otherwise be recognized in the marketplace or under Illinois law.³⁷

This Zero Emission Standard Plan exists to explain and define the process through which the IPA will conduct a procurement event to procure zero emission credits from zero emission facilities, and only “zero emission facilities” are capable of producing the “zero emission credits” to be delivered under the contracts entered into through this procurement process. What constitutes a zero emission facility is defined in the IPA Act as a generating facility “fueled by nuclear power” interconnected to PJM or MISO.³⁸ Likewise, a ZEC is defined as “a tradable credit that represents the environmental attributes of one megawatt hour (“MWh”) of energy produced from a zero emission facility.”³⁹

Throughout Section 1-75(d-5) (including in requirements related to submitting facility eligibility information),⁴⁰ the statute uses the term “facility” rather than “generating unit,” “power plant,” “nuclear plant,” or some alternative terminology. As some nuclear power plants feature multiple reactors, this raises the question of whether the entire plant is itself a “facility,” or whether each individual reactor constitutes a “facility” instead. The IPA believes this is addressed by the definition of “facility” found in Section 1-10 of the IPA Act, which determines that a facility is “an electric generating unit or a co-generating unit that produces electricity along with related equipment necessary to connect the facility to an electric transmission or distribution system.”⁴¹ While the term “generating unit” is not itself defined, because each reactor can function to generate electricity as an independent unit from another, and given that each may have its own unique in-service date and cost structure, a “generating unit”—and thus a “facility” for purposes of the Zero Emission Standard—should be defined at the reactor level, and not at the plant level.

³⁷ See for example, State of New York Public Service Commission, Order Adopting A Clean Energy Standard, CASE 15-E-0302, Case 16-E-0270, August 1, 2017, pp. 19-20.

³⁸ 20 ILCS 3855/1-10. A list of the facilities that meet this definition is in Appendix D.

³⁹ ~~Ibid.~~ Compare to a “renewable energy credit,” the definition of which is “a tradable credit that represents the environmental attributes of one megawatt hour of energy produced from a renewable energy resource.”

⁴⁰ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(A).

⁴¹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-10.

3.2 Requirements of the Plan

The Act requires the Plan to provide details for how the IPA will design and implement a zero emission credit procurement process to meet the requirements of Section 1-75(d-5) of the Act. To achieve the zero emission standard goals stated in the Act, the plan developed by the IPA seeks to do at least the following:

1. Ensure that all ZECs purchased under the plan will be cost effective as defined in the Act,⁴²
 - Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C) provides that this "cost effective" requirement is met if "the projected costs of procuring zero emission credits from zero emission facilities do not cause [the rate impact cap] to be exceeded." Further discussion of the rate impact cap, and the budget established through application of that cap, can be found in Chapter 4.
2. Describe and communicate the bidder eligibility requirements specified in the Act,⁴³
 - Additional information regarding the eligibility information to be provided to the IPA by potential bidders is described in Chapter 6. The IPA has also included a draft bid submission form containing the submittal requirements of Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) to this draft Plan, and seeks feedback on that form through the draft Plan comment process.
3. Communicate the requirements for interested parties to become eligible bidders,⁴⁴
 - As noted above, additional information regarding the eligibility information to be provided to the IPA by potential bidders is described in Chapter 6. The IPA has also included a draft bid submission form containing the submittal requirements of Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) to this draft Plan, and seeks feedback on that form through the draft Plan comment process.
4. Provide details regarding the bid evaluation and selection process that describe how the public interest criteria specified in the Act are formulated and applied toward selecting the winning bids,⁴⁵

⁴² See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

⁴³ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(A).

⁴⁴ See *id.*, 220 ILCS 5/16-111.5(e)(1).

⁴⁵ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C). The Act provides that "...winning bids shall be selected based on public interest criteria that include, but are not limited to, minimizing carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity consumed in Illinois and minimizing sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and particulate matter emissions that adversely affect the citizens of the State." The Act further states "The plan shall also describe in detail how each public interest factor shall

- Chapter 5 discusses how the public interest criteria specified in the Act will be applied to the selection of winning bids.
5. Determine and post the initial price for the ZECs to be procured,⁴⁶
 - The initial price for ZECs to be procured, as well as the accompanying calculations of that price, can be found in Chapter 4 below.
 6. Explain how the ZEC bid evaluation and selection process takes into consideration the maintenance of incremental benefits associated with existing zero emission generators,⁴⁷
 - Chapter 5 explains how the evaluation and selection process takes into account the maintenance of incremental benefits, specifically through impacting scoring by two key factors: a) whether the facility's costs are recovered through rates, and b) the economic stress that may be faced by the facility.
 7. Provide information regarding the contract forms and requirements for completing the procurement of cost effective ZECs.⁴⁸

In addition to these requirements, the IPA has also identified additional discrete requirements applicable to the Plan stemming from the governing law; those requirements, as well as the Section of the Zero Emission Standard in which the requirement is addressed, may be found in the Legislative Compliance Index included as Appendix H.

3.3 ZEC Procurement Contracts

The calculation for determining the number of ZECs to be annually procured through this process, as well as the counterparties to ZEC contracts, is defined through the IPA Act. Specifically, beginning with the delivery year commencing on June 1, 2017, the IPA shall, for electric utilities that serve at least 100,000 retail customers in Illinois (ComEd and Ameren Illinois), procure ZECs in an amount approximately⁴⁹ equal to 16% of the actual amount of electricity delivered by each electric utility to retail customers in the State during calendar year 2014. For an electric utility serving fewer than 100,000 retail customers in Illinois that requested the Agency to procure power

be considered and weighted in the bid selection process to ensure that the public interest criteria are applied to the procurement and given full effect.”

⁴⁶ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B).

⁴⁷ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

⁴⁸ More details regarding the ZEC contracts are provided in Chapter 5 of this plan.

⁴⁹ The IPA's interpretation of the word "approximately" is that the procurement accounts/allows for the rounding of the number of ZECs to a whole number (i.e., the IPA would not procure a partial ZEC-) and allows the IPA to not procure contracts with a marginal facility if only a small fraction of the facility's ZECs would be used to meet the Zero Emission Standard target.

and energy for all or a portion of the utility's Illinois load for the delivery year commencing June 1, 2016 (MidAmerican), the Agency shall procure ZECs in an amount approximately equal to 16% of the portion of power and energy to be procured by the Agency for the utility.⁵⁰ More information on the quantity of ZECs that will be required to be delivered under ZEC procurement contracts can be found in Section 4.5.

Here again, the Zero Emission Standard appears to mirror the approach taken to the procurement of RECs: the 16% of electricity delivered target "is the average of the percentage targets in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of Section 1-75 of this Act for the 5 delivery years beginning June 1, 2017" (i.e., the average of the state's RPS targets for 2017-2023).⁵¹ As with the procurement of RECs under Section 1-75(c) of the IPA Act, ZEC contracts procured under Section 1-75(d-5) of the IPA Act feature electric utilities as the counterparty for ZEC deliveries, with the electric utilities required to "retire all zero emission credits used to comply with the requirements of" the Zero Emission Standard.⁵²

While many REC contracts under Section 1-75(c) of the IPA Act are for 15 years in length, ZEC contracts "shall be for a term of 10 years ending May 31, 2027,"⁵³ with contracts including deliveries for the current (2017-2018) delivery year.⁵⁴ Indeed, by law, the entire Zero Emission Standard "shall become inoperative on January 1, 2028."⁵⁵ The IPA understands this to mean that no payments for ZECs (including for "unpaid contractual volume," discussed further in Section 3.5 below, or banked ZECs from prior delivery years in excess of that year's target quantities, discussed further at the conclusion of this Section) may be made after the ZEC contract delivery terms have ended or after the law has sunset.

As zero emission facilities are very large, the selection of winning facilities will be very lumpy—given the known size of nuclear power generating units, a very small number of facilities will be required to meet the statute's 16% target. This raises the question of whether another "marginal" facility be selected to receive a ZEC delivery contract if the first facilities selected allow for

⁵⁰ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1).

⁵¹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1).

⁵² 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(5).

⁵³ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1).

⁵⁴ Section 1-75(d-5)(1) makes clear that such contracts are to "begin[] with the delivery year commencing June 1, 2017." While the procurement of ZEC contracts will not occur until well into that delivery year, the IPA is unaware of any barrier that would prevent ZEC procurement volumes for the entire 2017-2018 delivery year from being met through ZEC delivery contracts even if those contracts are executed after the commencement of that delivery year. Further, the IPA understands that electric utility counterparties to such contracts are collecting funds for ZEC payments made for a full year of 2017-2018 ZEC deliveries.

⁵⁵ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(7)

satisfaction of the vast majority of this “approximately 16%” target. This issue is further complicated by the statute’s requirement that the “[t]he quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be all of the zero emission credits generated by the zero emission facility in each delivery year,” thus potentially saddling a facility owner with a contract for “all of the zero emission credits” it generates while having the expectation of receiving revenue for only a minor portion of those ZECs.

These considerations are best balanced by creating parameters governing the circumstances under which a marginal facility would be chosen. Specifically, if the IPA can facilitate a contract with the next-best “marginal” facility that would result in at least 50% of the zero emission facility’s credits being used to meet the statute’s 16% requirement, that facility will be granted a 10-year ZEC delivery contract. However, should that facility’s expected ZEC output be significantly greater than the ZECs it could deliver to meet the statute’s targets (specifically, over three times greater), no contract will be executed and the “approximately 16%” standard will be deemed to have been satisfied.

The requirement that “[t]he quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be all of the zero emission credits generated by the zero emission facility in each delivery year”⁵⁶ also raises a related issue—how to handle a scenario in which selected facilities’ output exceeds the number of ZECs required to meet the 16% delivery target for a given year. On this point, the IPA proposes that the resulting ZEC contracts allow for ZECs produced in excess of that delivery target be delivered and then banked for use in a subsequent year should too few ZECs be generated in that subsequent year to meet that year’s contract volume.

3.4 ZEC Pricing

The formula for determining the price per ZEC is set forth in the Zero Emission Standard as well. Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(B) of the IPA Act specifies that the price for each ZEC procured for a given delivery year shall be in an amount that equals the Social Cost of Carbon, expressed on a price per MWh basis starting at \$16.50 per MWh,⁵⁷ with the potential for being reduced to “ensure that the procurement of zero emission credits remains affordable for retail customers even if energy and capacity prices are projected to rise above 2016 levels reflected in the baseline market price index.”⁵⁸

The Act specifies that the ~~“social cost of carbon” cost of~~ \$16.50 per megawatt hour “social cost of carbon” is based on the U.S. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases,

⁵⁶ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75)(d-5)(1)(A).

⁵⁷ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75)(d-5)(1)(B).

⁵⁸ P.A. 99-0906, Zero Emission Standard Legislative Findings (Section 1.5)

which updated its estimate of the social cost of carbon dioxide in terms of dollars per metric ton in August 2016, using a 3 percent discount factor which is then converted to a dollar per MWh representation.⁵⁹ In accordance with the Act, the Social Cost of Carbon price is also increased by \$1 per MWh starting in 2023.⁶⁰

That price is then subject to a “market price adjustment,” which provides that the ZEC price be limited such that if the average price of a set of price indices of electric energy and capacity increases, the ZEC price in the applicable delivery year shall be reduced *below* that Social Cost of Carbon. The amount of this reduction (the “Price Adjustment”) is determined by the amount which the Market Price Index for the applicable delivery year exceeds the Baseline Market Price Index for the consecutive 12-month period ending May 31, 2016 of \$31.40 per MWh.⁶¹ If the Price Adjustment is greater than or equal to the Social Price of Carbon, such as in a scenario in which market energy and capacity prices recover to the extent that zero emission facilities should be receiving other revenues at levels sufficient to alleviate any economic stress, then the resulting price of a ZEC would be zero. Notably, the Price Adjustment (and resulting ZEC price) does not reflect the *actual* prices that any given zero emission facility bidding into the ZEC procurement receives in wholesale energy and capacity markets, or through bilateral sales; it instead provides a rough *proxy* for market conditions. If ~~such~~market conditions are ~~very~~ favorable for a facility with a ZEC delivery contract, then ZEC prices may be adjusted downward from the Social Cost of Carbon.

Further discussion about the ZEC price adjustment can be found in Chapter 4 below.

3.5 ZEC Procurement Cost Cap

In addition to providing a delivery-based percentage target for the number of ZECs to be procured and establishing a mechanism for calculating ZEC prices, the Zero Emission Standard also sets an annual cost cap on the amount that can be paid through customer surcharges for the purchase of ZECs.⁶² This cost cap limits the cost of ZECs to retail customers to no more than 1.65% of the amount paid per kWh by eligible retail customers during the year ending May 31, 2009.⁶³

This cost cap provides the basis for creating a ZEC procurement budget through applying the “resulting per kilowatt-hour amount” to “the actual amount of kilowatt-hours of electricity delivered

⁵⁹ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B)(i).

⁶⁰ See Id.

⁶¹ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B).

⁶² See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(2).

⁶³ See Id.

by the electric utility in the delivery year immediately prior to the procurement, to all retail customers in its service territory,”⁶⁴ producing the overall total amount that may be spent on ZEC purchases for a given delivery year (i.e., the ZEC procurement budget).

This creates a slight disconnect within the Act: the *price* for ZECs is calculated by a formula fixed in the law; the overall ZEC procurement *budget* defined through the rate impact cap limits how much can be paid for ZECs; and the procurement *quantities* are defined separately as 16% of electricity delivered.⁶⁵ Under certain circumstances, meeting statutory procurement quantities—~~let alone “all of the zero emission credits” produced by a facility~~—at that defined ZEC price would cause the ZEC procurement budget to be exceeded. And because both the price and quantity for the first year of ZEC deliveries (2017-2018) are currently known, the Agency can state confidently that procuring all of the ZECs at the price envisioned in Section 1-75(d-5)(2) would cause the cost cap for the year to be surpassed for the 2017-2018 delivery year.⁶⁶

This potential disconnect appears to have been anticipated by the drafters of the Act, as Section 1-75(d-5)(2) contains a provision referencing “unpaid contractual volume,” specifically stating that “[u]npaid contractual volume for any delivery year shall be paid in any subsequent delivery year in which such payments can be made without exceeding” the rate impact cap.⁶⁷ Stated differently, the Act appears to envision a regime in which ZECs are delivered at the price arrived at through the Social Cost of Carbon minus the Price Adjustment (the ZEC price) *up until* the rate impact cap for that delivery year is met; from that point forward, ZECs are to still to be delivered under contracts to meet the delivery ~~requirement~~ target requirements set forth in Section 1-75(d-5)(1) ~~and the requirement that contracts be for “all of the zero emission credits generated” by the winning facility,~~⁶⁸ but are considered “unpaid contractual volume” potentially eligible for a future year’s payment.

⁶⁴ See Id.

⁶⁵ The statute also states that “[t]he quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be all of the zero emission credits generated by the zero emission facility in each delivery year.” (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)).

⁶⁶ It is unclear whether “all of the zero emission credits generated by the zero emission facility” would likewise cause the cost cap to be exceeded, as a) no facilities will be selected until a procurement event takes place and b) facilities may produce significantly fewer than anticipated zero emission credits in a given delivery year due to an array of factors, including outages, mechanical failures, weather events, labor strife, permitting issues, etc.

⁶⁷ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(2).

⁶⁸ ~~As stated above, this quantity is Additional ZECs generated by the facility in excess of this requirement, if any, would be banked for use in meeting future years’ delivery targets (if necessary). As stated above, the quantity of ZECs generated by the facility is also~~ subject to the caveat in Section 1-75(d-5)(1) that “if the zero emission facility is owned by more than one entity, then the quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall

As a consequence, should the ZECs produced by the zero emission facilities selected in the IPA procurement exceed the ZEC volumes to be paid for at the ZEC price under the cost cap, the IPA understands that those ZECs statutorily ineligible for payment in the delivery year or generated in excess of that year's target procurement quantities will be delivered to the purchasing utility without charge for that particular delivery year, and will constitute "unpaid contractual volume" eligible for payment in a future delivery year when the rate cap does not limit the total amount paid for ZECs for that year- (but would be second in priority for payment behind the ZECs actually delivered in that year). This would offer the potential for payment to be made for the unpaid contractual volume of ZECs from previous delivery years should that then current delivery year feature a ZEC procurement budget greater than the payments required for ZECs delivered in that year at that year's ZEC price.⁶⁹

In its draft Plan, the Agency raised the question of what price should be paid for that unpaid contractual volume: the original delivery year's ZEC Price, or the ZEC Price applicable for the delivery year in which payments for the unpaid contractual volume of those ZECs are made. After review of parties' comments and further review of the law, the IPA proposes that the ZEC Price for the delivery year in which the ZEC was originally delivered—i.e., the earlier year—governs. Under the Zero Emission Standard, ZEC delivery quantities and ZEC prices are determined for each individual delivery year using the most recent price and load information. Applying a later delivery year's ZEC Price to ZECs delivered in a prior delivery year would result in a later delivery year's ZEC Price to apply to well over a delivery year's full volume, disconnecting a delivery year's quantities from its price. As that delivery year ZEC Price is set based on factors (i.e., the Price Adjustment) specific to that delivery year, and as those unpaid contractual volume ZECs were indeed delivered in that year, disconnecting that delivery year's ZECs from that delivery year's price would seem to run counter to the spirit—if not the letter—of the Zero Emission Standard.⁷⁰

be the amount of zero emission credits that are generated" only from that "portion of the zero emission facility that is owned by the winning supplier."

⁶⁹ ~~This raises the question of what price would be paid for "unpaid contractual volume" in a future delivery year: the ZEC price from the original delivery year, or the ZEC price used for the delivery year in which payment is actually made for the ZEC? On this point, the law appears to be unclear. As the IPA believes that the price paid per ZEC should be uniform across a given delivery year, the subsequent year's ZEC price should apply to any prior year's "unpaid contractual volume" (doing otherwise could potentially result in a host of different ZEC prices applying to a given delivery year), but would be interested in further comments on this draft ZES Plan on this topic.~~

⁷⁰ While the law could be more clear on this point, it is notable that Section 1-75(d-5)(2)'s discussion of "unpaid contractual volume" considers that volume to be "for" the original "delivery year"—and not "for" the "subsequent delivery year" in which payment is made. As annual calculations of the ZEC Price are to be made "for each delivery year" (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B), using the price actually calculated for that ZEC's delivery year for that year's

3.6 ZEC Procurement Process Overview

Certain elements of the Zero Emission Credit procurement process—such as the need to develop an underlying procurement plan, the formula for determining the ZEC price, the ZEC procurement quantities, and the process for registering potential bidders to the procurement—are expressed in the Zero Emission Standard law itself. For other elements of the ZEC procurement process, the IPA takes note of the Zero Emission Standard’s requirement that its procurement process “shall be conducted in conjunction with the procurement and plan approval processes required by subsection (c) of this Section and Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act, to the extent practicable.”⁷¹ Because it is clearly not “practicable” for the zero emission credit procurement to coincide with standard wholesale product procurements under Section 16-111.5 from a *timing* standpoint (given that the IPA’s annual electricity procurement plan will be filed in late September, approved in December, and result in procurement events in the spring of next year), the Agency understands this provision to require that the zero emission credit procurement process be handled “in conjunction with” the requirements of Section 16-111.5 procurement from a *process* standpoint, to the extent practicable.

Stated differently, where procedural aspects of Section 16-111.5 (especially Section 16-111.5(c)(1) and Section 16-111.5(e)), do not conflict with Section 1-75(d-5), then those processes are adopted. However, where aspects of Section 16-111.5 either a) directly conflict with Section 1-75(d-5) (such as Section 16-111.5(e)(4)’s requirement of “selection of bids on the basis of price” or Section 16-111.5(e)(3)’s requirement to establish a “price benchmark,” which directly conflict with Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C)’s requirement that “winning bids shall be selected based on public interest criteria” with ZEC prices determined pursuant to a formula found in the statute), or b) indirectly conflict as they would be impracticable to adopt given other requirements present in Section 1-75(d-5) (such as Section 16-111.5(f)’s requirement that the Commission “shall accept or reject the recommendations of the procurement administrator within 2 business days after” the receipt of reports, which may be ill-fitting for a ZEC procurement process requiring that the Commission produce a very detailed and intricate “public notice” of its own accompanying its acceptance or rejection of procurement results).⁷² —An appendix detailing which specific requirements in Section 16-111.5 which the IPA believes are applicable to the ZEC procurement process can be found in Appendix G.

After this Plan is approved by the Commission and bidder eligibility information is received as described in Section 2.4, the IPA will, consistent with the Commission’s Order approving the Plan,

unpaid contractual volume would appear to be most appropriate under the law. This approach also ensures that ZEC prices reflect the price applicable to the delivery year of the ZEC’s retirement (when the ZEC is “used”).

⁷¹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C-5).

⁷² See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C-5)(i)-(iii).

work with the Procurement Administrator (and other parties, to the extent envisioned under Section 16-111.5) on the development of bid forms, rules for the resulting bid process, the development of a standard form ZEC delivery contract, and other forms, documents, and guidelines governing the procurement event. As described in more detail in Section 6.2, bidders meeting the Zero Emission Standard’s eligibility requirements—i.e., zero emission facilities capable of producing and delivering zero emission credits for 10 delivery years, and satisfying the provisions of Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(A)—will be invited to submit bids for the zero emission credit procurement. Bids submitted shall reflect the actual and projected annual MWh production from the zero emission facility, which will in turn be used to calculate the annual ZEC quantity production from that facility. The IPA, through the zero emission credit procurement, will seek to procure the target number of ZECs being sought under the Plan, subject to the “marginal” bid discussion above.

The Procurement Administrator will recommend to the Commission successful bids based on how well these bids meet the public interest criteria specified in the Act. As detailed in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C), the public interest criteria used for bid evaluation are focused on the emissions that are avoided through the continued operation of a zero emissions facility;⁷³ those are described in detail in Chapter 5. The successful bidders, subject to approval by the Commission, will be those bidders that achieve the highest scores as determined through the bid evaluation process, also described in Chapter 5, which is based on the level to which the bid best meets the public interest criteria. Successful Should the Commission approve the Procurement Administrator’s selection of bids, successful bidders will execute ZEC purchase delivery contracts with Ameren, ComEd, and MidAmerican.

⁷³ Specifically, the statute requires that winning bidders “shall provide that winning bids shall be selected based on public interest criteria that include, but are not limited to, minimizing carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity consumed in Illinois and minimizing sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter emissions that adversely affect the citizens of this State. In particular, the selection of winning bids shall take into account the incremental environmental benefits resulting from the procurement, such as any existing environmental benefits that are preserved by the procurements held under this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly and would cease to exist if the procurements were not held, including the preservation of zero emission facilities. The plan shall also describe in detail how each public interest factor shall be considered and weighted in the bid selection process to ensure that the public interest criteria are applied to the procurement and given full effect.” (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C)).

4 ZEC Price, Volumes and Cost Cap Determination

4.1 Social Cost of Carbon

In the legislative findings to Public Act 99-0906, the General Assembly found that “that the Social Cost of Carbon is an appropriate valuation of the environmental benefits provided by zero emission facilities, provided that the valuation is subject to a price adjustment that can reduce the price for zero emission credits below the Social Cost of Carbon.”⁷⁴ Hence, the pricing mechanism used in the Zero Emission Standard begins with the Social Cost of Carbon as a baseline price for the environmental attributes represented by a Zero Emission Credit.

The Act specifies that the Social Cost of Carbon is \$16.50/MWh.⁷⁵ As explained in the Act, this Social Cost of Carbon price reflects the social cost of carbon dioxide emissions represented by the U.S. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases as calculated in the August 2016 Technical Update.⁷⁶ The Social Cost of Carbon price specified in the Act was apparently calculated based on converting the cost per metric ton to \$/MWh and using a 3% discount rate, and further adjusting for inflation for each delivery year. The cost per metric of carbon dioxide was converted to \$16.50/MWh based on state-wide carbon dioxide emissions measured in pounds/MWh for the applicable year. The Social Cost of Carbon price is not fixed, however; the Act further provides that beginning with the delivery year commencing June 1, 2023, the price per MWh shall increase by \$1/MWh, and continue to increase by an additional \$1/MWh each delivery year thereafter.

4.2 Baseline Market Price Index

As required by the Act, the Social Cost of Carbon is then required to be adjusted based on a Market Price Index; this adjustment is then used to establish a contractual ZEC price. That adjustment calculation begins with the establishment of a baseline price against which market changes can be considered, known as a Baseline Market Price Index.⁷⁷ The Act specifies that the Baseline Market Price Index (“BMPI”) for the consecutive 12-month period ending May 31, 2016 is \$31.40/MWh, which is based on the sum of:

⁷⁴ Public Act 99-0906, Zero Emission Standard Legislative Findings (Section 1.5).

⁷⁵ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B)(i).

⁷⁶ Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government, “Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866,” August 2016. Note that, the cost in the Technical Update is stated in dollars per metric ton of carbon dioxide which must be converted into a dollars per Megawatt hour basis.

⁷⁷ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B)(ii).

1. The average Day-Ahead energy price across all hours of such 12-month period at the PJM Interconnection LLC Northern Illinois Hub,
2. 50% multiplied by the Base Residual Auction (“BRA”), or its successor, capacity price for the rest of the RTO zone group determined by PJM Interconnection LLC (“PJM”), divided by 24 hours per day, and
3. 50% multiplied by the Planning Resource Auction (“PRA”), or its successor, capacity price for Zone 4 determined by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”), divided by 24 hours per day.

4.3 Market Price Index

The Market Price Index (“MPI”) for a delivery year represents a proxy for a specific delivery year’s market conditions. As set forth in the Act,⁷⁸ the MPI constitutes the sum of Projected Energy Prices and Projected Capacity Prices determined as follows:

1. *Projected Energy Prices*

The Projected Energy Prices for the applicable delivery year shall be calculated once for the year by the Agency using the forward market price for PJM’s Northern Illinois Hub. The forward market price shall be calculated as follows:

- The energy forward prices for each month of the applicable delivery year will be averaged for each trade date during the calendar year immediately preceding that delivery year to produce a single energy forward price for the delivery year. The forward market price calculation will use data published by the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”), or its successor.

2. *Projected Capacity Prices*

For the delivery years commencing June 1, 2017, June 1, 2018, and June 1, 2019, the projected capacity price will be equal to the sum of:

- i. 50% multiplied by the BRA, or its successor, price for the rest of the RTO as determined by PJM, divided by 24 hours per day and,
- ii. 50% multiplied by the resource auction price determined in the resource auction administered by the MISO, in which the largest percentage of load cleared for Local Resource Zone 4, divided by 24 hours per day, and where such price is determined by MISO.

While generally straightforward, one aspect of this calculation requires further discussion. For the PJM capacity price calculation, the statute specifically references the use of the price in the “BRA,

⁷⁸ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B)(iii).

or its successor.” For the 2017-2018 delivery year, there are actually *three* products that cleared in the BRA --- Annual,⁷⁹ Extended Summer DR, and Limited DR. In establishing a Market Price Index, the IPA has determined to use the price for the Annual product, because this is the only product which spans the entire delivery year and thus is the one that aligns best with the annual nature of the Market Price Index. However, for delivery years 2018-2019 and 2019-2020, as part of a PJM transition to a single product, the BRA includes two capacity products --- Capacity Performance Resource and Base Capacity Resource.⁸⁰ For the 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 delivery years, PJM procured approximately 84% of the BRA as the Capacity Performance Resource, and 16% of the BRA as the Base Capacity Resource. While any specific unit that cleared in the BRA would receive payments from only one of these categories, to ensure that the Market Price Index most accurately reflects the actual overall market price of capacity, the IPA recommends using a weighted average of the clearing prices for the Capacity Performance Resource and the Base Capacity Resource for the capacity price that will be used in the calculation of the MPI for these two delivery years.

For the delivery year commencing June 1, 2020, and each year thereafter, the projected capacity price shall be equal to the sum of:

- i. 50% multiplied by the BRA⁸¹, or its successor, price for the ComEd Zone as determined by PJM, divided by 24 hours per day, and
- ii. 50% multiplied by the resource auction price determined in the resource auction administered by MISO, in which the largest percentage of load cleared for Local Resource Zone 4, divided by 24 hours per day, and where such price is determined by MISO.

4.4 ZEC Price Calculation

To “ensure that the procurement of zero emission credits remains affordable for retail customers even if energy and capacity prices are projected to rise above 2016 levels reflected in the baseline market price index,”⁸² the ZEC Price for a given delivery year is determined by reducing the Social Cost of Carbon by the Price Adjustment as explained in Section 3.5. The Price Adjustment to the Social Cost of Carbon is the amount by which the MPI exceeds the BMPI for each delivery year (*i.e.* MPI – BMPI), where the BMPI is equal to \$31.40/MWh.

⁷⁹ The 2017-2018 Annual product is composed of Generation, Demand Resource (“DR”), and Energy Efficiency (“EE”) Resources.

⁸⁰ This is part of the transition to 2020-2021, when only one capacity product, the Capacity Performance Resource, will be procured in the BRA.

⁸¹ As noted above, effective delivery year 2020-2021 PJM will procure only one type of capacity product in the BRA --- the Capacity Performance Resource. From delivery year 2020-2021 and going forward, the IPA will use the price for the Capacity Performance Resource for the ComEd Zone in the calculation of the MPI.

⁸² Public Act 99-0906, Zero Emission Standard Legislative Findings (Section 1.5).

The MPI for a given delivery year is determined as the sum of (i) the Average Day-Ahead PJM Northern Illinois Hub Price, (ii) 50% of the PJM BRA price, and (iii) 50% of the MISO PRA price.

The following calculations were used to determine the 2017-2018 delivery year Market Price Index. The same methodology will be used to calculate the Market Price Index for each future delivery year.

First, energy prices: in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(B)(iii)(aa), the Act specifies the use of “the energy forward prices for each month of the applicable delivery year averaged for each trade date during the calendar year immediately preceding that delivery year to produce a single energy forward price for the delivery year,” using “data published by the Intercontinental Exchange, or its successor.”⁸³ However, in attempting to obtain this data, the IPA encountered a slight barrier: the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) publishes *futures* prices, not *forward* prices. Futures prices and forward prices are technically not identical, as the former is a financial product while the latter is a physically delivered product. That said, because the prices between futures and forward prices are substantially similar, and the use of the *futures* prices from ICE more closely follows the provisions of the Act than any other alternative (as price source still matches the statute, and the use of some alternative source for *forward* prices not only creates a new inconsistency with the plain language of the Act, but could result in the use of less reliable and less adequately vetted prices), the IPA believes that the use of futures prices from ICE is the most justified approach under the law. Thus, in determining the 2017-2018 delivery period Market Price Index, the Average Day-Ahead PJM Northern Illinois Hub Price was calculated using ICE data observed during calendar year 2016.⁸⁴ A summary of that data is available in Appendix A. The Agency will continue to use this approach so long as only futures prices, and not forward prices, are available from ICE.

Second, capacity prices: as capacity auctions have already occurred for the current delivery year, in calculating the 2017-2017 Market Price Index, the PJM BRA price was based on the actual clearing price for delivery year 2017-2018. Likewise, the MISO PRA price was based on the actual clearing price for delivery year 2017-2018. Details of these calculations can be found in Appendix A.

As detailed in Appendix A, for the 2017-2018 delivery year, the calculated value of the MPI is \$31.21/MWh. This is lower than the BMPI (\$31.40/MWh). Since the Price Adjustment may only

⁸³ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B)(iii)(aa).

⁸⁴ While the Act does not expressly specify whether to use the ICE Real-Time Futures Price or the ICE Day-Ahead Futures Price, the use of the Day-Ahead futures prices is consistent with how the Baseline Market Price Index is calculated, which specifies the use of “the average day-ahead energy price.” (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis added)).

“reduce[]” the ZEC price “below the Social Cost of Carbon by the amount . . . by which the market price index for the applicable delivery year exceeds the baseline market price index”⁸⁵ (i.e., it cannot operate to *increase* the ZEC price above the Social Cost of Carbon), this calculation results in no adjustment to the Social Cost of Carbon of \$16.50/MWh. **Therefore, the ZEC Price for delivery year 2017-2018 is \$16.50/ZEC.**

As described in Section 6.4.6.3 the ZEC Price for future delivery years will be updated May of each future year. The methodology used for future delivery years will be the same as described in this Section as used for the 2017-2018 delivery year. While the law is clear that once each year “the Agency shall calculate the payments . . . for the next delivery year” and “the Agency shall publish the payment calculations,”⁸⁶ the IPA proposes that prior to publishing the calculations each year, the Agency will consult with ICC Staff, the Procurement Monitor, and the contracting utilities on the calculations applicable to the upcoming delivery year with the goal of establishing agreement on the calculations prior to their publication.

4.5 ZEC Contractual Volume

The methodology for determining the amount of ZECs to be procured is specified in the Act.⁸⁷ For ComEd and Ameren, this calculation is straightforward: the procurement quantity is determined based on a portion of the delivered electricity to retail customers “for the calendar year 2014” multiplied by 16%, or 0.16.⁸⁸

For MidAmerican, however, a different load multiplier applies; Section 1-75(d-5)(1) requires that the procurement volume be “an amount approximately equal to 16% of the portion of power and energy to be procured by the Agency for the utility” for utilities under 100,000 retail customers participating in an IPA procurement process (i.e., MidAmerican).⁸⁹ Unlike for ComEd and Ameren, for which the 16% multiplier is based upon calendar year 2014, the Act does not expressly state what baseline year should be applied to MidAmerican—but does make its participation contingent on it being a utility for which “the Agency procure[s] power and energy for all or a

⁸⁵ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(B).

⁸⁶ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(D) (emphasis added).

⁸⁷ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1).

⁸⁸ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) (“Beginning with the delivery year commencing on June 1, 2017, the Agency shall, for electric utilities that serve at least 100,000 retail customers in this State, procure contracts with zero emission facilities that are reasonably capable of generating cost-effective zero emission credits in an amount approximately equal to 16% of the actual amount of electricity delivered by each electric utility to retail customers in the State during calendar year 2014.”)

⁸⁹ MidAmerican elected to participate in the IPA’s planning and procurement process in 2015 (i.e., for the 2016 Procurement Plan); the first delivery year for which the IPA conducted procurements for MidAmerican was thus the 2016-2017 delivery year.

portion of the utility's Illinois load for the delivery year commencing June 1, 2016.”⁹⁰ While the 16% multiplier could in theory be applied each year to the previous delivery or calendar year’s quantity of power procured by the Agency for MidAmerican, thus creating a floating ZEC Contractual Volume for MidAmerican, doing so would ~~introduce~~introduce unnecessary and seemingly not envisioned complexity and would require an approach fundamentally inconsistent with the set amounts used for ComEd and Ameren. Therefore, the Agency ~~recommends~~proposes using the 2016-2017 delivery year for determining MidAmerican’s ZEC contract volumes as it is the only full year of available data and connects with the delivery year used for participation designated in the statute. ~~The Agency invites interested parties to comment on if a different approach should be considered.~~

For each utility, the resulting amount of ZECs to be procured under the statute is described hereinafter as the “ZEC Contractual Volume.” In summary, the ZEC Contractual Volumes are:

- For Ameren and ComEd, the ZEC Contractual Volume is 16% of their respective energy delivered to retail customers in calendar year 2014 (measured in MWh at the retail meter level).
- For MidAmerican, the ZEC Contractual Volume is 16% of the power and energy procured for MidAmerican by the IPA for the 2016-2017 delivery year (measured in MWh at the retail meter level).

The data for the 2014 calendar year sales for Ameren and ComEd and the data for determining the power and energy procured for MidAmerican⁹¹ was obtained directly from the utilities through data requests issued on June 2nd, 2017. The utilities’ responses to those data requests are provided in Appendix B.

Based on the above-referenced formula and the sales data found in Appendix B, the amount of ZECs to be procured is as follows:

Ameren	=	36,897,391 * 16%	=	5,903,583 ZECs
ComEd	=	88,580,643 * 16%	=	14,172,903 ZECs
MidAmerican	=	263,664 * 16%	=	42,186 ZECs
Total (all utilities) ⁹²			=	20,118,672 ZECs

⁹⁰ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1).

⁹¹ MidAmerican provided data on (i) the total supply from third-party providers (ARES/RES), (ii) the total supply from MidAmerican owned generation, and (iii) the actual electricity delivered to retail customers. The procured power and energy for MidAmerican was determined as the difference between the total supply (third parties and MidAmerican owned) and the actual electricity delivered to retail customers.

⁹² Total may not match the sum of individual utility amounts due to rounding.

The total annual cost for procuring this quantity of ZECs based on a ZEC Price of \$16.50/ZEC would be \$331,958,084 (as shown in Appendix A, which provides the detailed calculation of the Contractual Volumes for the respective utilities). While that annual cost may vary in future years, subject to the Price Adjustment described above in Section 4.4.2, the Contractual Volume will remain constant for the duration of the zero emission credit program.

4.6 ZEC Cost Cap

As discussed in Chapter 3, the amount to be spent on ZECs for a given delivery year is limited by a cost cap to ensure that the procurement is cost-effective. Specifically, “the contractual volume receiving payments in such year shall be reduced for all retail customers based on the amount necessary to limit the net increase that delivery year to the costs of those credits included in the amounts paid by eligible retail customers in connection with electric service to no more than 1.65% of the amount paid per kilowatthour by eligible retail customers during the year ending May 31, 2009.”⁹³ Further, “the result of this computation shall apply to and reduce the procurement for all retail customers, and all those customers shall pay the same single, uniform cents per kilowatthour charge under subsection (k) of Section 16-108 of the Public Utilities Act.”⁹⁴ Finally, “to arrive at a maximum dollar amount of zero emission credits to be paid for the particular delivery year, the resulting per kilowatthour amount shall be applied to the actual amount of kilowatthours of electricity delivered by the electric utility in the delivery year immediately prior to the procurement, to all retail customers in its service territory.”⁹⁵

For delivery year 2017-2018, the calculation is based on the following formula:

$$(1.65\% * 2008-2009 \text{ Rate for Eligible Retail Customers}) * 2016-2017 \text{ kWh to all retail customers}$$

On June 2nd, 2017, the IPA issued a data request to the utilities to obtain (i) the revenue and sales data to determine the 2008-2009 Rate for Eligible Retail Customers for Ameren, ComEd and MidAmerican, (ii) the actual amount of electricity delivered in the 2016-2017 delivery year to all Retail Customers of Ameren and ComEd, and (iii) the data for determining the power and energy procured for MidAmerican. The utilities’ data responses are provided in Appendix B.

Exactly how the rate impact cap should apply to MidAmerican is less clear from the statutory language of the Zero Emission Standard than with the other utilities. Section 1-75(d-5)(2) of the IPA Act provides that the rate impact cap “shall apply to and reduce the procurement for all retail

⁹³ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(2).

⁹⁴ Id.

⁹⁵ Id.

customers, and all those customers shall pay the same single, uniform cents per kilowatt-hour charge under subsection (k) of Section 16-108 of the Public Utilities Act,” and that the rate impact calculation “shall be applied to the actual amount of kilowatt-hours of electricity delivered by the electric utility in the delivery year immediately prior to the procurement, to all retail customers in its service territory” in developing a “maximum dollar amount” budget.⁹⁶ For MidAmerican, this *could* be interpreted to mean that while its annual procurement quantities are determined by only that portion of its load procured by the IPA, its procurement budget would be based off all “electricity delivered . . . to all retail customers in its service territory.” Such an approach would result in a ZEC procurement budget over seven times greater, proportionately, than MidAmerican’s ZEC procurement targets.

Against the backdrop of a statute featuring detailed, fixed methodologies for determining ZEC prices and procurement quantities, the IPA believes that such a massive disconnect between quantity and budget cannot be what was intended by the drafters of the statute. Accordingly, MidAmerican’s procurement budget—as with its procurement target—must also be adjusted based on only that portion of its Illinois jurisdictional load served by IPA procurements.⁹⁷ MidAmerican’s procurement quantities used for determining its ZEC procurement budget are adjusted consistent with this approach in the calculations below.

Based on this approach, the applicable amount of electricity delivered by each electric utility to all retail customers for 2016-2017 is:

Ameren	-	35,886,827 MWh delivered by Ameren
ComEd	-	88,075,281 MWh delivered by ComEd, and
MidAmerican	-	263,664 MWh procured by the IPA on behalf of MidAmerican
Total (all utilities)	-	124,225,772 MWh

The 2008-2009 Rates for Eligible Retail Customers for each utility are:⁹⁸

Ameren	-	10.77 ¢/kWh
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⁹⁶ Id. (emphasis added).

⁹⁷ The IPA also makes this determination mindful of the Commission’s decision in Docket No. 15-0541 approving the IPA’s 2016 Procurement Plan, in which the Commission adopted a methodology for calculating a renewable resources budget based only on MidAmerican’s share of load met through IPA procurements. (See Docket No. 15-0541, Final Order dated December 16, 2015 at 133).

⁹⁸ The detailed calculations of the rates for Eligible Retail Customers are provided in Appendix A.

ComEd	-	11.82 ¢/kWh
MidAmerican	-	6.18 ¢/kWh

The ZEC Cost Cap also must be adjusted to account for the costs incurred by the utilities to retire ZECs.⁹⁹ This adjustment assumes that the quantity of ZECs delivered matches the ZEC contractual volume. Should a greater number of ZECs be delivered in a delivery year, the additional costs of retiring those ZECs would be carried forward as an adjustment to the subsequent delivery year ZEC Cost Cap.

<u>Ameren</u>	<u>5,903,583 ZECs @ \$0.05/ZEC =</u>	<u>\$295,179</u>
<u>ComEd</u>	<u>14,172,903 ZECs @ \$0.05/ZEC =</u>	<u>\$708,645</u>
<u>MidAmerican</u>	<u>42,186 ZECs @ \$0.05/ZEC =</u>	<u>\$2,109</u>
<u>Total (all utilities)</u>	<u>20,118,672 ZECs @ \$0.05/ZEC =</u>	<u>\$1,005,934</u>

Application of the formula stated above and the ZEC retirement fee adjustment results in the following ZEC Cost Caps for each utility:¹⁰⁰

Ameren	-	<u>_\$63,748,017</u> <u>452,838</u>
ComEd	-	<u>_\$171,817,027</u> <u>108,382</u>
MidAmerican	-	<u>\$268,705</u> <u>\$266,596</u>
Total (all utilities)	-	<u>\$235,833,749</u> <u>\$234,827,816</u>

For 2017-2018, the total maximum amount that can be spent to procure ZECs for all the utilities is therefore \$234,827,816. The total ZEC Cost Cap of ~~\$235,833,749~~\$234,827,816 is lower than the \$331,958,084 amount based on the ZEC Contractual Volume and the applicable ZEC Price for delivery year 2017-2018. ~~For 2017-2018 the total maximum amount that can be spent to procure ZECs for all the utilities is therefore \$235,833,749.~~

4.7 ZEC Volume Cap

The ZEC Volume Cap in any delivery year, for each utility, is the maximum amount of ZECs that can be purchased based on the ZEC Cost Cap. The ZEC Volume Cap is derived by dividing the

⁹⁹ Currently the cost of retiring a ZEC in GATS is \$0.05/ZEC. See the discussion in Section 6.5 for more information on the tracking of ZECs. The current GATS fee schedule is available at: <https://www.pjm-eis.com/-/media/pjm-eis/documents/appendix-a-gats-fees.ashx?la=en>. Retiring a certificate is accomplished by transferring it into a “Reserve Subaccount” and the reason that would be stated is to make an environmental claim (“ENV”).

¹⁰⁰ The detailed calculations of the ZEC Cost Caps are presented in Appendix A.

ZEC Cost Cap by the ZEC Price which is the Social Cost of Carbon minus the Price Adjustment as described in Section 3.4.

The ZEC Volume Caps for delivery year 2017-18 for each utility are as follows:

Ameren	-	3, 863,516 <u>845,627</u> ZECs to be paid at \$16.50/ZEC
ComEd	-	10, 413,153 <u>370,205</u> ZECs to be paid at \$16.50/ZEC
MidAmerican	-	16, 285 <u>157</u> ZECs to be paid at \$16.50/ZEC

The ZEC Volume Caps result in the following ZEC Unpaid Contractual Volumes for the 2017-18 delivery year:

Ameren	-	2, 040,066 <u>057,956</u> ZECs
ComEd	-	3, 759,750 <u>802,698</u> ZECs
MidAmerican	-	25,901 <u>26,029</u> ZECs
Total (all utilities)	-	5, 825,717 <u>886,683</u> ZECs

As discussed above, unpaid contractual volumes for any delivery year can be paid in a subsequent delivery year in which such payments for unpaid contractual volumes can be made without exceeding the ZEC Cost Cap.¹⁰¹ The 5,825,717,886,683 unpaid ZECs will therefore be eligible for payment in a future delivery year when the rate cap does not limit the total amount paid for ZECs in that year.

¹⁰¹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(2).

5 Bid Evaluation and Selection

In developing this Plan, the IPA considered many potential evaluation approaches for applying public interest criteria to the selection of bids. Each approach offered potentially valid methodological considerations, but all approaches faced challenges of insufficient data to support some of the necessary assumptions for bid selection. In addition, the IPA appreciates the comments and suggestions that were provided in the public comment period for the draft plan. For the bid selection approach described in this Plan, the IPA has endeavored to include suggestions to refine the initial bid selection approach. The revised approach adequately considers the Act's goal of preserving zero emission facilities and the environmental benefits associated with the operation of these facilities. It also takes into consideration the public interest criteria described in the Act while minimizing methodological complexity to the extent that is reasonably possible. The bid selection process proposed by the IPA also seeks to utilize assumptions that can be reasonably drawn from publicly available information to reduce the exercise of discretion, maximize transparency, and leverage the utilization of reliable data.

5.1 Public Interest Criteria

One of the most important components of the Zero Emission Standard Procurement Plan is the process for selecting winning bids based on the public interest criteria described in the Act. Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(C) of the Act specifies that,

“...winning bids shall be selected based on public interest criteria that include, but are not limited to, minimizing carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity consumed in Illinois and minimizing sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter emissions that adversely affect the citizens of this State.”

A key focus of the “public interest criteria” concerns environmental benefits maintained through the continued operation of zero emission facilities that would potentially cease to operate without a zero emission credit program that monetizes some or all of the value associated with the environmental attributes of their generation.¹⁰²

Quantifying the benefits associated with these environmental attributes, and how that quantitative calculation may be altered by the ZEC procurement process resulting in the continued operation of a zero emission facility, is necessary to meet the Act’s requirements that,

¹⁰² Specifically, the law provides that “the selection of winning bids shall take into account the incremental environmental benefits resulting from the procurement, such as any existing environmental benefits that are preserved by the procurements held under this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly and would cease to exist if the procurements were not held, including the preservation of zero emission facilities.” (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C)).

“The plan shall also describe in detail how each public interest factor shall be considered and weighted in the bid selection process to ensure that the public interest criteria are applied to the procurement and given full effect.”¹⁰³

This Chapter fulfills that requirement. It includes a consideration of each public interest factor and provides a scoring (weighting) approach. While the Act allows the IPA to consider additional public interest criteria other than those specified in the Act (“...but are not limited to...”), the IPA believes the criteria specifically described in the Act are sufficient for effectuating the purposes of this Plan and the IPA is not proposing additional criteria.¹⁰⁴

Quantifying incremental environmental benefits is complex, and involves determining the amount and nature of emissions that would result from the mix of generation sources which would provide the replacement generation for the zero emission facility, had the facility been retired. The Agency’s bid selection process takes into account the incremental benefits of the environmental attributes associated with a zero emission facility (in terms of public interest criteria emissions) that would be avoided by the continued operation of the zero emission facility.

The Agency’s development of its bid selection process—and the development of its plan generally—endeavored to “consider any reports issued by a State agency, board, or commission under House Resolution 1146 of the 98th General Assembly and paragraph (4) of subsection (d) of Section 1-75 of this Act, as well as publicly available analyses and studies performed by or for regional transmission organizations that serve the State and their independent market monitors.”¹⁰⁵ While those sources were ~~indeed~~ given consideration, the Agency’s primary focus was on leveraging the best available information to track the evaluation of zero emission facility benefits consistent with the criteria in the statute.

As specified in the Act, the public interest criteria emissions include: minimizing carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions that result from electricity consumed in Illinois, as well as minimizing sulfur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), and particulate matter (PM) emissions that adversely affect residents of the state. The bid selection process is thus focused on quantifying the relative benefits provided by each zero emission facility based on a determination of how each facility meets the

¹⁰³ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

¹⁰⁴ In addition, the IPA notes that while it may have discretion ~~to~~ consider additional public interest factors (“that include, but are not limited to...”), the statutory direction offered to the ICC for the public notice accompanying its review and acceptance or rejection of procurement results is more direct and prescriptive, and focused only on the criteria expressly mentioned in the statute. Avoiding a disconnect between the criteria used by the IPA to score bids and the Commission’s public statement and accompanying analysis regarding its decision to approve (or reject) bids should result in a more focused, linear, and efficient procurement process.

¹⁰⁵ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

public interest criteria. The bid evaluation process is described in more detail in the following sections.

Public interest criteria pollutants are not emitted during the operation of nuclear powered generating facilities; as such, these facilities have been designated by statute to be zero emission facilities. If zero emission facilities ceased operating, the electricity generated by these facilities generally would be replaced by electricity generated from a resource mix that is predominantly fueled by fossil fuels. In PJM and MISO, coal and natural gas generation would most likely replace the generation from retiring zero emission facilities.¹⁰⁶ Fossil fuel resources, even if equipped with state-of-the-art emission controls, by the nature of the combustion of fuels that contain or form pollutant generating materials, would inevitably emit the public interest criteria pollutants including CO₂, SO₂, NO_x, and PM in generating the replacement electricity.

Electric generating resources are dispatched to minimize the total system-wide cost of producing electricity while safely operating the transmission system. To achieve this objective, resources with the lowest variable cost are dispatched first. Following industry-standard system dispatch logic, zero emission facilities along with renewable energy resources are the first resources dispatched followed by the next-most efficient fossil-fueled resources.¹⁰⁷ In some states, including Illinois, renewable ~~resources, generation~~ (primarily wind and solar resources, ~~represent~~) represents a growing portion of the generation mix. However, given the likely position of renewable ~~resources~~ energy generation in the dispatch queue over the lifetime of the Zero Emission Standard,¹⁰⁸ the bid evaluation process assumes that the replacement generation will be composed of coal and natural gas-fueled generation.¹⁰⁹ This is because, in general terms, generating facilities are dispatched by the independent system operators (PJM and MISO for the purposes of the facilities under consideration in this Plan) in terms of production cost with the least expensive units

¹⁰⁶ For example, in the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency's report provided in response to H.R. 1146, the replacement generation mix was assumed to be 80% coal and 12% natural gas-fired. See: p.118 "Potential Nuclear Power Plant Closings in Illinois, Impacts and Market-Based Solutions, Response to the Illinois General Assembly Concerning House Resolution 1146. Prepared by: Illinois Commerce Commission, Illinois Power Agency, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, and Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, January 5, 2015. Also see: Haratyk, Geoffrey, "Early Nuclear Retirements in Deregulated U.S. Markets: Causes, Implications and Policy Options," MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Working Paper Series, CEEPR WP 2019-009, March 2017; Nuclear Energy Institute, White Paper, "Status and Outlook for Nuclear Energy In the United States," November 2016.

¹⁰⁷ FERC Docket No. AD05-13-000, "Report on Security Constrained Economic Dispatch," The Joint Board for the PJM/MISO Region. May 24, 2006.

¹⁰⁸ Section 1-75(d-5) becomes inoperative on January 1, 2028. (See 20 ICLS 3855/1-75(d-5)(7)).

¹⁰⁹ Replacement generation would constitute a combination of increased dispatch of existing units as well as potentially new generation yet to be built.

dispatched first until sufficient generation is dispatched to meet the load; this process is known as economic dispatch. All of the units that are dispatched receive the clearing price, which is the cost of generation for the last quantity of generation needed to meet the load. Some generating units that need to operate whenever the facility is available, such as nuclear or wind ~~resources~~, participate in the economic dispatch process as price takers. These units bid low enough prices to ensure dispatch and take the clearing price which, in some hours, may be less than their operating costs. These units are almost always dispatched as they are at the bottom, or low price end, of the dispatch queue.¹¹⁰ In PJM and MISO ~~typically~~, coal and natural gas-fired generating units ~~typically~~ operate at the margin in the dispatch queue and are thus the last units dispatched to meet load.^{111,112} Therefore, the replacement generation mix used in the ZEC bid scoring reflects the ~~contribution of increased emissions from~~ the coal and natural gas generation sources ~~to that would serve as the state-wide replacement~~ generation mix for the ~~state in which the~~ zero emission facility ~~is located~~ that would be retired.¹¹³

5.2 Bid Scoring and Selection

The proposed bid evaluation and selection process involves developing a selection score for each ZEC bid using the public interest criteria to develop that score, with the highest scoring facilities emerging as winning bidders. In developing the scoring process, emphasis was placed on using an approach that incorporates the emission factors into ~~the~~ bid selection and which reflects the

¹¹⁰ “EPA’s Final Clean Power Plan Compliance Pathways Economic and Reliability Analysis,” PJM Interconnection, September 1, 2016, p.46.

¹¹¹ Page 19 of the 2016 PJM State of the Market report provides the breakdown of marginal resources (i.e. the last unit dispatched): “Marginal Resources. In the PJM Real-Time Energy Market, in 2016, coal units were 44.9 percent of marginal resources and natural gas units were 43.8 percent of marginal resources. In 2015, coal units were 51.7 percent and natural gas units were 35.5 percent of the marginal resources.”

~~http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2016/2016-som-pjm-volume1.pdf~~
~~http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2016/2016-som-pjm-volume1.pdf~~

¹¹² Table 1 of the 2016 MISO State of the Market Report shows that in 2016 generation by coal and natural gas set real-time energy prices 99% of the time (coal 55% and natural gas 44%).

~~<https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Report/IMM/2016%20State%20of%20the%20Market%20Report.pdf>~~

¹¹³ State-wide emission and generation data are utilized in the IPA’s bid selection methodology in part because data reported by the U.S. EPA and U.S. EIA is available at the State level on a consistent and comparable basis. Such data is not available in a consistent and comparable way for, say, the location of a facility *within* a state or through viewing the facility as part of a broader region, thus introducing the potential for inconsistent or discretionary treatment in scoring facilities through utilizing a different approach.

environmental attribute benefits associated with the emissions-related public interest criteria that would be provided by the continued operation of a zero emission facility: (i.e., “preserved”).

The state-wide emissions and generation-related data utilized to develop the proposed zero emission facility scoring methodology are sourced from publicly available databases including emissions data from the U.S. EPA National Emissions Inventory (“NEI”) and emissions and generation data from the U.S. EIA.¹¹⁴ To determine the impact of the public interest criteria, the proposed bid selection methodology uses generation weighted emission factors for all emission criteria, with the exception of CO₂, in terms of pounds of relevant pollutant per megawatt hour (pounds/MWh), developed on a statewide basis ~~for the state where each zero emission facility seeking to participate in the ZEC procurement is located.~~ In a way to connect this methodology with the facility’s statutorily-required disclosures to the extent possible, the proposed bid selection methodology also utilizes the facility eligibility information that bidders are required to submit for zero emission facilities seeking to bid ZECs into the IPA’s procurement—specifically, ~~facility capacity, the 2005 to 2015 average annual generation from the facility, along with facility operating costs.~~¹¹⁵

The quantity of the public interest criteria emissions resulting from the expected generation resource mix that would replace the electricity generated by a zero emission facility submitting a bid to the procurement provides the basis for scoring bids.¹¹⁶ The proposed bid selection methodology also calculates adjusted emission factors that are applied to the score available for each of the public interest criteria CO₂, SO₂, NO_x, and PM emissions. PM emissions are divided into primary fine particulate matter for particulates with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less (PM_{2.5}) and particulates with a diameter of greater than 2.5 micrometers but not more than 10 micrometers (PM₁₀).¹¹⁷ Scoring to reflect the CO₂ emissions benefits associated with a zero emission facility is based on the fraction of the bidding facility’s generation that can be expected to be consumed in Illinois.

The statute does not provide express guidance on the weighting attributed to each pollutant in determining an overall facility score. While the actual adverse impacts of these pollutants to

¹¹⁴ The most recent emissions data are taken from the NEI 2016 release, www.epa.gov/air-emissions-inventories/national-emissions-inventory-nei, which includes data for 2014 for emissions of SO₂, NO_x, PM₁₀, and PM_{2.5} from electric generation by fuel source by state. CO₂ emissions are sourced from the U.S. EIA State Carbon Dioxide Emissions data for 2014 released on November 3, 2016, www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state. The electric generation data by fuel source is sourced from the U.S. EIA State Electricity Profiles, Electric power industry generation by primary energy sources, 2014, www.eia.gov/electricity/state.

¹¹⁵ The eligibility information template is shown in Appendix F.

¹¹⁶ The quantity of CO₂ emissions is based on the statewide average.

¹¹⁷ PM_{2.5} and PM₁₀ cover the bulk of the primary particulate matter emitted from fossil fuel fired generating plants.

citizens of Illinois may not be evenly distributed, the IPA believes that any attempts to prioritize one pollutant above another could introduce problematic discretion into the bid scoring process and may be inconsistent with language in the Act that does not differentiate among the importance of the public interest criteria.¹¹⁸ Thus, under the proposed bid selection methodology, up to a baselinemaximum of 25 points would be awarded for each of the CO₂, SO₂, NO_x, and PM emission criteria (PM₁₀, and PM_{2.5} each would receive 12.5 points, totaling 25 points overall for PM) for an equal weighting for each criterion in the ZEC bid selection. Notably, equal *treatment* would not necessarily result in each pollutant having equal *influence* in bid scoring, as this approach still captures the intensity of differences offered between competing bids for a given pollutant. ~~The IPA would be interested in receiving feedback in the draft Plan comment process on whether this is indeed the optimal weighting approach.~~

~~As described in more detail below in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, each of the emission factors is adjusted based on the location of the replacement generation relative to Illinois and the further adjusted to account for the facility size. This adjustment produces a weighting for the bid selection component for each emission criterion.~~ The overall score for each facility will be the sum of the resulting emissions ~~criteria~~ scores, adjusted for facility economic stress.

~~In the bid selection process the following factors and adjustments are utilized:~~

~~**Emission Factor** – pounds/MWh emitted for each emission criterion (State specific amounts for CO₂, NO_x, SO₂, PM_{2.5}, and PM₁₀)~~

5.2.1 Non-CO₂ Emissions Scoring Metrics

For non-CO₂ emissions, the statute directs that the Plan’s proposed bid selection approach consider “emissions that adversely affect the citizens of this State.”¹¹⁹ Thus, a primary focus of the proposed bid selection methodology involves determining the degree to which emissions from a facility’s replacement generation would indeed have adverse impacts on Illinois citizens.

For measuring those adverse impacts – and producing resulting facility scores accordingly – the proposed approach focused on ~~two~~three main sources of information: 1) the expected replacement generation mix ~~and resultant~~; 2) the pollutant intensity associated with the replacement generation mix in the ~~state~~states in which the facility replacement generation is located ~~(and thus any replacement generation may be expected to come from)~~; and 2; and 3) the degree to which wind

¹¹⁸ While the ZEC priced is based in part on the Social Cost of Carbon specifically, the General Assembly found in enacting the Zero Emission Standard that “the Social Cost of Carbon is an appropriate valuation of the *environmental benefits* provided by zero emission facilities,” and not only carbon emissions avoided. (P.A. 99-0906, Zero Emission Standard Legislative Findings (Section 1.5) (emphasis added)).

¹¹⁹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

patterns result in those airborne pollutants being blown into Illinois ~~resulting in~~ causing adverse impacts to Illinois residents.

The Non-CO₂ emissions scoring metrics will be calculated as follows:

1. Estimate the likely location of the replacement generation;
2. Determine the emissions intensity for each pollutant by state providing the replacement generation, based on the state average emission rate for each pollutant associated with the replacement generation mix divided by the RTO average emissions rate for that pollutant associated with the replacement generation mix;
3. Adjust the emissions intensity for each pollutant by state providing replacement generation based on wind direction and distance factors;
4. Multiply the adjusted emissions intensity for each pollutant for each state providing replacement generation by the share of replacement generation provided by that state; and
5. Sum the state-specific results from every state providing replacement generation to obtain the Emissions Scoring Metric for that pollutant.

5.2.1.1 Replacement Generation Mix

In the report prepared by PJM at the request of the ICC as part of the H.R. 1146 Report, PJM modeled the likely emissions impact in 2019 that would result from the retirement of nuclear facilities in Illinois. Based on the results of PJM's modeling of the postulated retirement of Byron 1 and 2 as well as Quad Cities 1 and 2, 32% of the resulting RTO-wide increases in CO₂ emissions, 30% of the resulting increases in SO₂ emissions, and 37% of the resulting increases in NO_x emissions would occur from replacement generation located in Illinois.¹²⁰ While these findings concern emissions rather than generation, emissions are highly correlated to generation. Thus, if an Illinois zero emission facility were to retire, it is reasonable to assume that 33%¹²¹ of the replacement generation would be located in Illinois and the remainder would be located elsewhere in PJM or MISO.

Similarly, in calculating the Emission Scoring Metric for each non-CO₂ pollutant, 33% of the replacement generation is assumed to be in the state in which the retiring zero emission facility is

¹²⁰ See PJM Interconnection, LLC, PJM Response to Illinois Commerce Commission Request to Analyze the Impact of Various Illinois Nuclear Power Plant Retirements, October 21, 2014.

¹²¹ 33% represents the average percentage of the RTO-wide increases in CO₂, SO₂, and NO_x emissions associated with replacement generation located in Illinois attributable to the postulated PJM nuclear plant retirements described in the PJM H.R. 1146 report.

located, and the remaining 67% of the replacement generation is assumed to occur in shares proportionate to the generation in each of the other states in the relevant RTO, either PJM or MISO.

5.2.1.2 Determining State Emissions Intensity

For each non-CO₂ pollutant, the emissions intensity will be determined for each state in which replacement generation is located. Because coal and natural gas generation these are likely to be the marginal resources that comprise the replacement generation mix, the state's weighted average emissions rate for each pollutant emitted from coal and gas generation in the state will be calculated. Each state's weighted average emission rate is calculated using the following formula:

Weighted Average Emission Rate for a pollutant = (state's tons of coal emissions of pollutant + state's tons of gas emissions of pollutant) * (2,000 lbs/ton) / (MWh of coal generation + MWh of gas generation).

To determine each state's emission intensity for the pollutant, the Weighted Average Emission Rate for a pollutant will be divided by the Weighted Average Emission Rate for all states in the RTO according to the following formula:

State Emission Intensity for a pollutant = State Weighted Average Emission Rate for coal and gas generation / RTO Weighted Average Emission Rate for coal and gas generation.

5.2.1.3 Wind and Distance Adjustments to State Emission Intensity

For NO_x, SO₂, PM_{2.5}, and PM₁₀ emissions, the public interest criteria in the Act are focused on the adverse effects of these emissions on the citizens of Illinois, which is a different standard from that applied to CO₂ as described in Section 5.2.2. The non-CO₂ emission factors for the zero emission facility replacement generation will depend on the location of the replacement generation relative to Illinois. As these emissions are airborne pollutants emitted from fossil fuel electric generating facilities, the proposed weighting is determined based on the average amount of time that the wind blows into Illinois from the state where the replacement generation is located, adjusted for the distance that state is from Illinois to account for the increasing dispersion and deposition of pollutants over increasing distances.

The wind direction weighting methodology for the non-CO₂ emission factors was developed for efficient and transparent application in the bid selection methodology and uses publicly available state-wide generation and emissions data to maximize its transparency.

Other alternatives to this approach were considered, but ultimately not adopted. These alternatives included atmospheric dispersion and deposition modeling, and the EPA's Avoided Emissions and Generation Tool ("AVERT").


Dispersion and deposition modeling systems seek to characterize the dynamics of point source emission plumes identifying physical and chemical interactions of the pollutants in the plume. The models are designed to quantify exposures to various pollutants based on pollutant concentration, including total exposure on a percentage basis over distances, cumulative exposures, and provide dispersion maps which depict the patterns of pollutant dispersions and magnitude of concentrations. These models require extensive input data for each point source modeled (including data for each specific replacement generating unit). The results of the dispersion models do not correlate well with the parameters utilized to quantify the specific outputs needed for use in the Agency's bid selection methodology.

AVERT was developed for the U.S. EPA as a tool to estimate hourly emissions and generation benefits of energy efficiency and renewable energy policies and programs.¹²² The tool tracks generation, heat input and emissions by individual fossil generating unit to identify changes in regional emissions when units are retired, replaced or retrofitted with pollution controls. AVERT is available to the public along a Statistical Module that includes prepackaged data from the EPA's Air Markets Program Data, which performs statistical analysis on SO₂, NO_x, and CO₂ emissions. The EPA version of AVERT did not analyze PM emissions, although PM emissions capabilities are available from third party analytics firms. ~~To accomplish this,~~ One reason that the IPA determined not to use AVERT is that the EPA cautions that AVERT is only intended for analyzing the emission factor impacts of energy efficiency and renewable energy policies and programs—so this effort would have been well outside of the scope of AVERT's intended use, risking the introduction of inaccuracies and requiring additional analysis and calibration to create the factors needed for this procurement.

A 21-year average of wind direction into Illinois is used to determine the adjustments to the State Emissions Intensity for each of the non-CO₂ emission factors. The average wind direction data is shown in Figure 1. The data are reported by the Illinois State Water Survey, Water and Atmospheric Resource Monitoring Program. The stations that had a full 21 years of data, 1996 through 2016, were utilized to develop the average wind direction distribution for the state. The data sources utilized included the following stations which had a complete data set over that time period: Belleville, Bondville, Brownstown, Carbondale, Champaign, DeKalb, Dixon Springs, Fairfield, Freeport, Monmouth, Olney, Peoria, Perry, Rend Lake, Springfield, St Charles, and Stelle.

¹²² U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fact Sheet for Decision Makers, AVOIDED Emissions and generation Tool (AVERT)," <https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/avoided-emissions-and-generation-tool-avert.html>

Figure 1. 21-year Average Illinois Wind Direction



To calculate the emission factor weights for each state, first, the sum of the primary direction and the two adjacent directions is taken: for example, if the facility is located to the southwest of Illinois, the three directional components are taken (i.e. components WSW, SW, and SSW, in the figure above). By way of example, the sum for a zero emission facility located in Missouri would be 27.4% since that would be the total amount of time, on a 21 year average, that wind would be blowing into Illinois from the west-southwest to south-southwest direction. Second, that sum is then multiplied by the distance adjustment factor. The distance adjustment factor accounts for the increasing reduction in the concentration of pollutants over increasing distances and is the ratio of the approximate distance of the center of each state from the center of Illinois divided by 1,000 miles. To take Missouri as an example again, that distance adjustment ratio is 0.79 leading to an overall wind direction and distance emission factor weight of 0.22. ~~-determined by taking the weighted average emissions associated with the expected~~ Calculations of the wind direction and distance emission factor weights for each state are provided in Appendix C.

Finally, for each non-CO₂ pollutant, the product of the wind and direction adjustment is multiplied by the state Emission Intensity to give the Adjusted State Emission Intensity.

5.2.1.4 Calculating the Non-CO₂ Emission Scoring Metric

To calculate the Non-CO₂ Emissions Scoring Metric for a pollutant for each state that provides a share of the replacement generation mix for that facility's state. These weights are determined using 2014 state level generation in MWh from the EIA to calculate the relative ratios of coal and

~~natural gas to the combined total generation from the two fuels. Table 1 shows the expected, the state's Adjusted State Emission Intensity for that pollutant is multiplied by the state's share of replacement generation. For each state, that result indicates the degree to which replacement generation in that state will adversely impact Illinois residents through the emission of the pollutant being scored. The share of replacement generation mix for each state with a zero emission facility in PJM or MISO will be 33% as described above for the state in which the zero emission facility is located, and the remaining 67% will be allocated on a generation-weighted (coal and gas-fired generation) basis across the other states in the applicable RTO.~~

~~Table 1. Expected~~ The resulting state-level scores are then added together to yield the Emission Scoring Metric.

This approach is used only for NO_x, SO₂, PM_{2.5}, and PM₁₀. ~~Replacement Generation Mix by State~~¹²³

State	Coal	Natural Gas
AR	78%	22%
IA	96%	4%
IL	94%	6%
LA	26%	74%
MD	88%	12%
MI	81%	19%
MN	88%	12%
MO	95%	5%
MS	25%	75%
NJ	7%	93%
OH	79%	21%
PA	60%	40%
VA	50%	50%
WI	82%	18%

~~The emission factors are adjusted based on the location of the zero emission facility submitting a ZECs bid relative to Illinois. The emission factor adjustments reflect weighting for the bid selection score taking into consideration whether the facility is located in Illinois, or in a MISO or PJM state other than Illinois. The emission factor adjustments provide scoring weights for each emission factor based on how likely the public interest emission criteria from the generation that would replace the output from a zero emission facility will impact the citizens of Illinois.¹²⁴ The impact of each of the emission factors relating to SO₂, NO_x, PM₁₀, and PM_{2.5} depends on the relative location of the facility and the average direction that the wind blows into Illinois from the~~

¹²³ Data for determining the state replacement generation mix is sourced from U.S. EIA State Electricity Profiles. See: <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/>.

¹²⁴ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

~~general location of the replacement generation, which is assumed to be located in the state where the zero emission facility is located. This is discussed further in Section 5.2.2 below.~~

Through the language of the statute, CO₂ presents a different case: the bid selection process is instead directed to consider “minimizing carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity consumed in Illinois,”¹²⁵ and thus a different methodology is used that considers the sources of the electricity consumed in Illinois. As discussed further in Section 5.2.2 below, the impact of the CO₂ emission factors is weighted using a proxy for the relative flow of power between the ComEd market area of PJM and the rest of PJM for any zero emission facilities that are located in the PJM states outside of Illinois, while a similar proxy is used to weight the CO₂ emission factors for zero emission facilities located in the MISO states outside of Illinois.

5.2.2 CO₂ Scoring

~~In theory, the~~ The scoring to reflect the impact of CO₂ emissions for zero emission facilities located both in and outside of Illinois could be developed through several approaches depending on data availability. The Act specifies that the CO₂ emission criterion consider the CO₂ emissions “that result from electricity consumed in Illinois.”¹²⁶ However, not only is Illinois a net exporter of electricity, it exports annual amounts greater than the ZEC procurement target.¹²⁷ Since the replacement generation is assumed to come from coal and natural gas-fired generation located within the same state as the zero emission facility being replaced, one approach could be to assume that only zero emission facilities located in Illinois would qualify to receive *any* CO₂ emissions scoring credit because any facility located in another state would not impact net CO₂ emissions from electricity consumed in Illinois. This approach would reflect an “all or nothing approach” based on a narrow interpretation of the Act.

~~A more reasonable~~ Another approach, ~~and one which better recognizes that power does indeed flow from other states into Illinois for consumption in Illinois (even if only occasionally),~~ would be to base the CO₂ emissions criteria scoring on modeled power flows between Illinois and the other states in MISO and PJM. Under this approach to CO₂ scoring, zero emission facilities located in states outside of Illinois, but in either MISO or PJM, would be credited for the CO₂ emissions generated based on the portion of the replacement generation that originated from outside of Illinois: but produced power modeled to be consumed in Illinois. While that approach may be attractive in certain respects, the IPA does not view production simulation modeling as an entirely reliable approach to determining the emissions generated by the resources that would replace zero emission facilities. In developing any such model, the wide range of assumptions that would need

¹²⁵ Id.

¹²⁶ Id.

¹²⁷ U.S. EIA, Illinois-State Profile and Energy Estimates, Profile Analysis, updated April 20, 2017.

to be made would require the exercise of a tremendous amount of discretion by the modeler. For example, assumptions would have to be made about the future of the Clean Power Plan (or successor carbon regulations), or future trends in natural gas and/or coal prices or regulations, all of which are issues for which there is no consensus.

Perhaps the optimal way of determining electricity consumed in Illinois from other states' facilities would be simply to base the credit for CO₂ emissions avoided by zero emission facilities located outside of Illinois on the *actual* power flows into and out of Illinois. Unfortunately, electrons are not “tagged” or tracked at so granular a level, and consistent and verifiable data regarding actual interstate power flows between Illinois and the other states in MISO and PJM is not readily available from a public source.¹²⁸ But there may be proxies for that information. To the extent that a proxy for power flows relies on actual, documented, verifiable information about imports and exports of energy/electricity, the IPA believes that it represents a superior alternative to the open-ended discretion required by modeling.

This proxy exists in the form of capacity imports into Illinois, and given the limitations on available data, the IPA believes that it constitutes the best option for determining “carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity consumed in Illinois” in scoring qualifying facilities. For zero emission facilities located in MISO, the proxy would involve the ratio of the imports for MISO Zone 4 (which covers the Illinois portion of MISO) to the planning reserve margin requirements for the 2017-2018 Planning Resource Auction results. This ratio of 0.0779, reflecting that 7.79% of Zone 4 requirements are met with capacity imports from elsewhere in MISO, would be applied to the benefits score for the CO₂ emissions avoided for zero emission facilities located in MISO states outside of Illinois. A ratio of 0.9221, reflecting that most of the Zone 4 requirements would be met from resources in the state, would be applied to the CO₂ emissions benefit score for zero emission facilities located in the MISO portion of Illinois. ~~The table below~~ Table 1 shows the import proxy that would be used as a percentage (7.79%) to adjust the CO₂ emissions benefits for zero emission facilities located in the MISO Zone 4 in Illinois and in the MISO states outside of Illinois.

Table 1. 2017-2018 Delivery Year Import ProxiesProxy for MISO Zone 4¹²⁹

	MISO Zone 4
Imports (MW)	771
Planning Reserve Margin Requirement (MW)	9,894

¹²⁸ The IPA contacted MISO and PJM to ascertain if interstate power flow data were publicly available. No such data were available from MISO and power flow data for PJM has been designated as critical energy infrastructure information (CEII) and cannot be publicly disseminated.

¹²⁹ 2017-2018 BRA Planning Parameters, MISO 2017/2018 Planning Resource Auction Results.

Import Proxy (%)	7.79%
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Unlike, MISO, PJM does not publish the results of the actual capacity that a locational deliverability area (“LDA”)¹³⁰ imports from other LDAs in PJM. However, PJM ~~establishes~~ provides the ~~Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (“CETO”) for each LDA. CETO represents the amount of capacity that a given LDA must be able to import (i.e., the import capability required)~~ cleared in order to meet the PJM reliability criteria ~~each LDA in the BRA.~~ For each LDA, PJM also publishes the Reliability Requirement.¹³¹ The ~~relationship~~ difference between an LDA’s ~~CETO~~ cleared capacity and the applicable Reliability Requirement can serve as a proxy for the amount of capacity that is imported into the LDA relative to its overall capacity needs. PJM started modeling the Illinois portion of PJM (the ComEd Zone) as an LDA beginning with the 2017-2018 delivery year. The ComEd LDA’s cleared capacity for the 2017-2018 delivery year is 22,551 MW and the Reliability Requirement is 28,991 MW. The difference is 6,440 MW or 22.2%. The table below shows the import proxy that would be used as a percentage (7.79%) to adjust the CO₂ emissions benefits for zero emission facilities located in the PJM zone in Illinois and in the PJM states outside of Illinois.

¹³⁰ An LDA is a geographic area within the PJM region that has limited transmission capability to import capacity to satisfy the area’s reliability requirement.

¹³¹ For LDAs the reliability requirement is the sum of the LDA’s internal capacity and the Capacity Emergency Transfer Objective (“CETO:”). CETO represents the amount of capacity that a given LDA must be able to import (i.e., the import capability required) in order to meet the PJM reliability criteria.

Table 2. 2017-2018 Delivery Year Import ~~Proxies~~ Proxy for PJM’s ComEd LDA¹³²

	PJM ComEd LDA
CET <u>BRA Cleared Capacity</u> (MW)	2,290 <u>22,551</u>
Reliability Requirement (MW)	28,991
<u>Imports (MW)</u>	<u>6,440</u>
Import Proxy (%)	7.90 <u>22.2</u> %

Therefore, a ratio of ~~0.079~~ 22.2, reflecting that ~~7.9~~ 22.2% of ComEd Zone requirements are to be met with imports from elsewhere in PJM, would be applied to the benefits score for the CO₂ emissions avoided for zero emission facilities located in PJM outside of Illinois. ~~A ratio of 0.921, reflecting that most of the ComEd Zone requirements would be met from resources in the state, A ratio of 0.778~~ would be applied to the CO₂ emissions benefit score for zero emission facilities located in the PJM portion of Illinois.

~~5.2.2 NO_x, SO₂, PM_{2.5}, and PM₁₀ Scoring~~

~~For NO_x, SO₂, PM_{2.5}, and PM₁₀ emissions, the public interest criteria in the Act are focused on the adverse effects of these emissions on the citizens of Illinois, which is a different standard from that applied to CO₂ as described in Section 5.2.1. The non-CO₂ emission factors for the zero emission facility replacement generation will depend on its location relative to Illinois. As these emissions are airborne pollutants emitted from fossil fuel electric generating facilities, the proposed weighting is determined based on the average amount of time that the wind blows into Illinois from the state where the replacement generation is located, adjusted for the distance that state is from Illinois to account for the increasing dispersion and deposition of pollutants over increasing distances.~~

~~The wind direction weighting methodology for the non-CO₂ emission factors was developed for efficient and transparent application in the bid selection methodology and uses publicly available state-wide generation and emissions data to maximize its transparency.~~

~~Other alternatives to this approach were considered, but ultimately not adopted. These alternatives included atmospheric dispersion and deposition modeling, and the EPA’s Avoided Emissions and Generation Tool (“AVERT”).~~

~~Dispersion and deposition modeling systems seek to characterize the dynamics of point source emission plumes identifying physical and chemical interactions of the pollutants in the plume. The~~

¹³² 2017-2018 BRA Planning Parameters, MISO 2017/2018 Planning Resource Auction Results.


~~models are designed to quantify exposures to various pollutants based on pollutant concentration, including total exposure on a percentage basis over distances, cumulative exposures, and provide dispersion maps which depict the patterns of pollutant dispersions and magnitude of concentrations. These models require extensive input data for each point source modeled (including data for each specific replacement generating unit). The results of the dispersion models do not correlate well with the parameters utilized to quantify the specific outputs needed for use in the Agency's bid selection methodology.~~

~~AVERT was developed for the U.S. EPA as a tool to estimate hourly emissions and generation benefits of energy efficiency and renewable energy policies and programs.¹³³ The tool tracks generation, heat input and emissions by individual fossil generating unit to identify changes in regional emissions when units are retired, replaced or retrofitted with pollution controls. AVERT is available to the public along a Statistical Module that includes prepackaged data from the EPA's Air Markets Program Data, which performs statistical analysis on SO₂, NO_x, and CO₂ emissions. The EPA version of AVERT did not analyze PM emissions, although PM emissions capabilities are available from third party analytics firms. One reason that the IPA determined not to use AVERT is that the EPA cautions that AVERT is only intended for analyzing the emission impacts of energy efficiency and renewable energy policies and programs so this would have been outside of the scope of AVERT's intended use; that could introduce inaccuracies and would need additional analysis and calibration to create the factors needed for this procurement.~~

~~A 21 year average of wind direction into Illinois is used to determine the relative weighting for each of the non-CO₂ emission factors. The average wind direction data is shown in Figure 1. The data is reported by the Illinois State Water Survey, Water and Atmospheric Resource Monitoring Program. The stations that had a full 21 years of data, 1996 through 2016, were utilized to develop the average wind direction distribution for the state. The data sources utilized included the following stations which had a complete data set over that time period: Belleville, Bondville, Brownstown, Carbondale, Champaign, DeKalb, Dixon Springs, Fairfield, Freeport, Monmouth, Olney, Peoria, Perry, Rend Lake, Springfield, St Charles, and Stelle.~~

¹³³ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Fact Sheet for Decision Makers, AVOIDED Emissions and geneRation Tool (AVERT)," <https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/state/local/climate/avoided-emissions-and-generation-tool-avert.html>

~~Figure 1. 21-year Average Illinois Wind Direction~~



~~To account for the increasing reduction in the concentration of pollutants over increasing distances, the scoring model calculates a relative distance adjustment factor, which is the ratio of the approximate distance of the center of each state from the center of Illinois divided by 1,000 miles.¹³⁴ As the modeling of pollutant dispersion and deposition is very complex, the Agency invites interested parties to comment on this distance adjustment and what alternative approaches could be utilized, if any.~~

~~To calculate the emission factor weights, first, the sum of the primary direction and the two adjacent directions is taken: for example if the facility is located to the southwest of Illinois, the three directional components are taken (i.e. components WSW, SW, and SSW, in the figure above). By way of example, the sum for a zero emission facility located in Missouri would be 27.4% since that would be the total amount of time, on a 21 year average, that wind would be blowing into Illinois from the west southwest to south southwest direction. Second, that sum is then multiplied by the distance adjustment factor. To take Missouri as an example again, that distance adjustment ratio is 0.79 leading to an overall wind direction and distance emission factor weight of 0.22. Calculation of the wind direction and distance emission factor weights are provided in Appendix C.~~

¹³⁴ 1,000 miles is an estimate of the outer bounds of PJM and MISO from Illinois and thus the maximum distance a replacement power plant that emits NO_x, SO₂, and PM could be from Illinois.

5.3 Incremental Environmental Benefits Preserved

The Zero Emission Standard expressly addresses four discrete pollutants to be considered, and then also requires that “the selection of winning bids shall take into account the incremental environmental benefits resulting from the procurement, such as any existing environmental benefits that are preserved by the procurements held under this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly and would cease to exist if the procurements were not held, including the preservation of zero emission facilities.”¹³⁵ As a result, the IPA understands that the statute directs it to ensure that facility scoring “take into account” the risk that a qualifying zero emission facility may close “but for” receiving revenues for the environmental attributes of its generation—not that such a facility would be unable to bid if it would stay open otherwise (as the Zero Emission Standard merely stated that this factor be taken “into account”), but only that the environmental attributes preserved should be diminished in facility scoring by the degree to which the IPA can discern whether the facility would have continued to operate. As the potential for closure impacts benefits across all four public interest pollutant criteria, the IPA’s proposed scoring approach ~~creates multipliers~~ includes a multiplier to those pollutant scores to account for the risk of closure faced by a facility.— due to economic stress.

There is simply no easy method for determining whether a given facility would in fact close without the benefit of a zero emission credit contract. Public statements by facility owners could be helpful, but may also be made for any number of reasons—including posturing to obtain advantageous policy outcomes—and past statements about a facility’s risk of closure may not reflect anticipated future market conditions. Similarly, obtaining statements of intention from facility owners as part of this procurement process may also lend itself to false positives. The IPA has instead sought to rely on objective and obtainable information to determine whether a zero emission facility indeed faces a risk of closure without receiving revenues for its environmental attributes, and thus that the selection of winning bids helps ensure that the facility’s “environmental benefits” are “preserved.”

~~To do this, the IPA’s proposed approach to determining whether a facility is indeed at risk of closure focuses on two factors: first, whether the facility’s costs are recovered through rates (in which case it could simply petition its public utilities commission for the collection of additional revenue from ratepayers to address competitive market shortfalls); and second, the economic stress facing the facility. How those factors figure into the scoring offered to qualifying facilities bidding into the zero emission credit procurement is addressed in the sections below.~~

~~5.3.1 Risk-Based Multiplier~~

~~Zero emission facilities operating in competitive electricity markets, such as in Illinois, compete on a merchant basis where the facility’s revenues are subject to commodity price fluctuations and~~

¹³⁵ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

~~supply/demand dynamics. Alternatively, facilities that are able to recover their costs through State regulated rates are less exposed to the risks associated with competitive market conditions. Rate-based facilities do not rely on market prices to cover the costs of operation and provide a regulated return on investment to their owners. These facilities can rely on regulatory processes to adjust rates to ensure that return on investment. With greater exposure to fluctuating market conditions, merchant facilities have a greater risk of early retirement brought about by economic stress than facilities with rate-based cost recovery.¹³⁶~~

~~Nuclear generating unit closures or planned retirements prior to the expiration of the unit's NRC operating license are driven primarily by one or a combination of the following factors: adverse market conditions, state policy decisions such as agreements with political or regulatory authorities, or structural and mechanical problems such as steam generator failures. For example, the Crystal River 3 unit in Florida, and the San Onofre 2 and 3 units in California are examples of plants where structural and mechanical problems led to their closure because of the prohibitive cost that would have been required for repairs. The planned retirements of Indian Point 2 and 3 in New York as well as Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 in California reflect a combination of adverse market conditions and State policy decisions.~~

~~Since 2013, six nuclear generating units have been retired, three of these units were closed due to structural and mechanical reasons as described above, and three units were closed due to adverse market conditions. Of the units that retired due to adverse market conditions, Kewaunee in Wisconsin and Vermont Yankee in Vermont were operating in competitive markets, while the small single unit Fort Calhoun in Nebraska was operated by a public power agency.¹³⁷ As of the second quarter of 2017, the owners/operators of 19 units have announced plans to close or have indicated that their units are in danger of retiring prematurely because they are losing money.¹³⁸ All of these units with the exception of Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 are merchant facilities operating in competitive markets.~~

~~A key bid scoring consideration in the Act involves maintaining the environmental attributes of existing zero-emission facilities through the procurement of ZECs: "In particular, the selection of winning bids shall take into account the incremental environmental benefits resulting from the~~

¹³⁶ See: Congressional Research Service, "Financial Challenges of Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," R44715, December 14, 2016. Haratyk, Geoffrey, "Early Nuclear Retirements in Deregulated U.S. Markets: Causes, Implications and Policy Options," MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Working Paper Series, CEEPR-WP 2017-009, March 2017.

¹³⁷ Nuclear Energy Institute, "Nuclear Costs in Context," April 2017.

¹³⁸ These units are: Fitzpatrick, Clinton, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, Diablo Canyon 1 and 2, Three Mile Island 1, Indian Point 2 and 3, Nine Mile Point 1 and 2, Ginna, Palisades, Perry, Davis Besse, and Beaver Valley 1 and 2.

~~procurement, such as any existing environmental benefits that are preserved by the procurements held under this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly and would cease to exist if the procurements were not held, including the preservation of zero emission facilities.¹³⁹~~

~~In order to reflect the lesser risks that zero emission facilities with rate based cost recovery opportunities are exposed to as compared with zero emission facilities that are operated on a merchant basis, the Agency will incorporate a rate based risk multiplier into the process for selecting successful bids. To ensure that this reflection of risk is significant without being entirely determinative (as the Zero Emission Standard does not prohibit facilities with costs recovered through rates from participating, as the Renewable Portfolio Standard does in Section 1-75(e)(1)(J)), a multiplier of 0.5 will be applied to the bid scores of facilities with rate based cost recovery, while a multiplier of 1.0 (i.e., no discount to the environmental benefits at all) will be applied to the bid scores of merchant zero emission facilities.¹⁴⁰ For this draft Plan, the IPA would be interested in receiving comment on whether this multiplier level is appropriate in discounting the risk of closure faced by rate based facilities, or if there is a sound, well supported basis for the use of a different multiplier level.~~

5.3.25.3.1 Economic Stress Multiplier

~~In addition to whether a facility's costs are recovered through rates, the~~The degree to which a zero emission facility may be at risk of closure due to economic and market conditions can be ~~measured~~assessed through the facility's operating costs measured against ~~an average baseline~~proxy for revenues. If a facility has a particularly high cost structure, it should have a higher level of economic stress: ~~(unless it is in a region in which electricity prices are higher)~~. If a facility is able to produce electricity at a lower cost, then it is presumably facing reduced economic stress and at less risk of closure: ~~(unless it is in a region with lower electricity prices)~~.

To capture this dynamic, the IPA's proposes the use of an economic stress multiplier ("ESM"), which works to determine whether a given facility faces economic stress greater or lesser than a baseline market rate: adjusted for regional differences in electricity prices. The ESM reflects the

¹³⁹ ~~20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).~~

¹⁴⁰ ~~As part of the submission of eligibility information, bidders will be required to certify the status of each zero emission facility as either a) a merchant facility or b) a facility that recovers its costs through regulated rates. In the case of a facility owned by more than one entity, to maintain consistency with the statutory directive that "if the zero emission facility is owned by more than one entity, then the quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be the amount of zero emission credits that are generated from the portion of the zero emission facility that is owned by the winning supplier," this certification shall be based on that individual bidder's "portion of the zero emission facility" owned by it. (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)).~~

general condition that zero emission facilities with higher operating costs, ~~—~~ (as defined above/below) relative to imputed revenues, are more likely to face economic stress and potential closure than facilities with lower operating costs: ¹⁴¹ relative to imputed revenues. ¹⁴²

The ESM is calculated as follows: to maintain consistency with other information found in the statute, the ESM is calculated through the ratio of the zero emission facility's operating costs ~~divided by the Base Market Price Index of \$31.40/MWh. (expressed in \$/MWh), divided by the Base Market Price Index ("BMPI") of \$31.40/MWh adjusted for basis between the BMPI and the facility's local nodal energy price.~~ ¹⁴³ The calculation also includes a cap on the ESM of 1.53 to reflect that at a certain point, a facility's likelihood of retirement is sufficiently large enough that its economic stress beyond the cap is not relevant.

The Economic Stress Multiplier is the lesser of the 1.53 cap or the operating costs (in \$/MWh) divided by the sum of \$31.40/MWh and the basis (in \$/MWh).

5.3.1.1 Operating Costs and ESM Cap

The zero emission facility operating costs utilized to determine the ESM would be the sum of the fuel expenses, operating & maintenance expenses and the capital expenses necessary to maintain operation of the facility as reported through the final facility eligibility information form, which is provided in draft format as Appendix F. ¹⁴⁴ For purposes of making this determination, operating cost data will be taken from the eligibility information that each zero emission facility interested in submitting a bid is required to submit to the IPA (thus maintaining additional consistency with information expressly required to be submitted in the statute). ¹⁴⁵ ~~As this~~ This information will be certified by the bidder for accuracy and will be subject to additional review ~~and verification~~ by the Agency and the Procurement Administrator, ~~the IPA is confident that this information will be sufficiently accurate for determining a bid score multiplier. For this draft Plan, the IPA would be interested receiving comments on whether a comparison of operating costs to a statutorily referenced baseline market price index is appropriate for establishing an economic stress~~

¹⁴⁴ ~~Congressional Research Service, "Financial Challenges of Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," December 14, 2016.~~

¹⁴² Congressional Research Service, "Financial Challenges of Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," December 14, 2016.

¹⁴³ Basis in this context reflects the difference between prices at different nodes and the Northern Illinois Hub.

¹⁴⁴ The zero emission facility costs as used in the ESM are defined by the Nuclear Energy Institute as shown in the whitepaper "Nuclear Costs in Context" updated April 2017. The ESM is determined based on the fuel costs, O&M costs and sustaining capital costs selected from the eligibility information supplied by the potential bidders to be consistent with industry cost analysis approach presented in the NEI whitepaper.

¹⁴⁵ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(A)(iii).

~~multiplier, or if there is a sound, well-supported basis for the use of different information, such as a local or regional cost baseline for a given facility—and if so, what information should be used?~~

~~5.41.1 Scoring Calculation~~

~~The ESM is being used as a proxy for the risk of facility closure. However, the degree to which the facility’s costs exceed a certain level of economic stress does not increase the probability of its retirement. Through capping the value of the ESM, the scoring approach ensures that facilities facing a similar risk of retirement are therefore treated equally, irrespective of the increased extent to which each zero emission facility’s costs exceed its revenues.~~

~~The maximum ZEC Price is \$16.50, thus any facility bidding in to the IPA ZEC procurement is committing to operate for no more than an incremental \$16.50/MWh. A facility’s economic stress beyond that amount is not relevant to the ZES program. The ESM cap is determined based on a generic nuclear facility with assumed revenues of the BMPI (\$31.40/MWh). The facility’s costs in excess of the amount of the BMPI plus \$16.50/MWh would not be considered in calculating the ESM. The facility’s ESM would therefore be capped at 1.53, which is the ratio that results from calculating $\$31.40 + \16.50 divided by $\$31.40$.~~

~~5.3.1.2 BMPI Basis Adjustment~~

~~Each facility’s costs are compared against a proxy for the competitive market conditions facing that facility. A facility in a region with higher average electricity prices can survive higher costs better than a facility located in a region with lower average electricity prices, all else equal. The relevant comparison for a unit then is between its costs and a proxy for the electricity prices that determine the facility’s revenues. Since actual unit revenues are not publicly available, may be extremely difficult to incorporate into bid scoring, and carry significant confidentiality concerns,¹⁴⁶ the IPA will rely on public data reported for the historical average price differentials between regions in PJM and MISO. These price differentials are reflected in the basis between different locational marginal prices (“LMPs”) in an RTO, which are publicly reported. For each facility, the BMPI used for the ESM will be adjusted by the average day-ahead basis for the 12-month period ending May 31, 2016 between the PJM Northern Illinois Hub and the facility’s nodal LMP. This period used for the adjustment is the same time period as used in calculating the BMPI.~~

¹⁴⁶ Unlike operating cost information, which may be confidential only for the facility owner, information about bilateral agreements providing actual revenues to the facility carry confidentiality concerns not only for the bidding facility owner, but also for counterparties to those agreements uninvolved with the Zero Emission Standard.

5.3.2 Rate-based Facilities

A key consideration for scoring bids concerns maintaining the environmental attributes of existing zero emission facilities through the procurement of ZECs: “In particular, the selection of winning bids shall take into account the incremental environmental benefits resulting from the procurement, such as any existing environmental benefits that are preserved by the procurements held under this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly and would cease to exist if the procurements were not held, including the preservation of zero emission facilities.”¹⁴⁷ Facilities that are able to recover their costs through state regulated rates are less exposed to the risks associated with competitive market conditions, and are thus less likely to retire than facilities that operate on a merchant basis. These facilities do not rely on market prices to cover the cost of operation; instead, they can rely on regulatory processes to adjust rates to ensure that return on investment and provide a regulated return on investment to their owners. By contrast, zero emission facilities operating in competitive electricity markets, such as Illinois, compete on a merchant basis, with revenues that are subject to commodity price fluctuation and supply/demand dynamics. Greater exposure to fluctuating prices under competitive market conditions means that merchant facilities have a greater risk of early retirement brought on by economic stress than facilities with rate-based cost recovery.

This can be seen in the recent history of nuclear generating unit retirements. Since 2013, six nuclear generating units have been retired, three of these units were closed due to structural and mechanical reasons, and three units were closed due to adverse market conditions.¹⁴⁸ Of the units that retired due to adverse market conditions, Kewaunee in Wisconsin and Vermont Yankee in Vermont were operating in competitive markets, while the small single-unit Fort Calhoun in Nebraska was operated by a public power agency.¹⁴⁹ In addition, as of the second quarter of 2017, the owners/operators of 19 units have announced plans to close or have indicated that their units are

¹⁴⁷ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C).

¹⁴⁸ Nuclear generating unit closures or planned retirements prior to the expiration of the unit’s NRC operating license are driven primarily by one or a combination of the following factors: adverse market conditions, state policy decisions such as agreements with political or regulatory authorities, or structural and mechanical problems such as steam generator failures. For example, the Crystal River 3 unit in Florida, and the San Onofre 2 and 3 units in California are examples of plants where structural and mechanical problems led to their closure because of the prohibitive cost that would have been required for repairs. The planned retirements of Indian Point 2 and 3 in New York as well as Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 in California reflect a combination of adverse market conditions and State policy decisions.

¹⁴⁹ Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Costs in Context,” April 2017.

in danger of retiring prematurely due to revenue shortfalls.¹⁵⁰ With the exception of Diablo Canyon 1 and 2, all of these units are merchant facilities operating in competitive markets.

At the same time, although risk of facility closure must be “take[n] into account” under the statute, the Zero Emission Standard does not prohibit facilities with costs recovered through regulated rates from participating in the IPA ZEC procurement process (as the Renewable Portfolio Standard does in Section 1-75(c)(1)(J)). However, to reflect the ability of rate-based facilities to earn guaranteed returns through a regulatory process, rate-based facilities will be assumed to have revenues equal to their operating cost and thus will have an ESM of 1.0.¹⁵¹

5.4 Scoring Calculation

~~The emission factors described in the previous sections are used to develop the scoring weighting, which then provides the basis for determining the emission criteria multipliers that are applied to obtain the score for each of the public interest criteria emissions. Emission metrics for a zero emission facility that participates in the procurement are developed based on a calculation that provides a value which reflects a measure of the amount of each of these pollutants that would be prevented from being emitted by the continued operation of the zero emission facility. An emission scoring metric for each emission criterion, based on the expected replacement generation mix, is calculated by taking the ratio of the emissions factor in a given state to the average emissions factor in the applicable RTO.¹⁵² A facility size metric is included to account for the size of the zero emission facility relative to the average size of a nuclear facility sited in that RTO.¹⁵³ Facility generation is accounted for by multiplying the scoring metrics and weights by the **Facility 10-year Average Capacity Factor.**¹⁵⁴~~

¹⁵⁰ These units are: Fitzpatrick, Clinton, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, Diablo Canyon 1 and 2, Three Mile Island 1, Indian Point 2 and 3, Nine Mile Point 1 and 2, Ginna, Palisades, Perry, Davis Besse, and Beaver Valley 1 and 2.

¹⁵¹ As part of the submission of eligibility information, bidders will be required to certify the status of each zero emission facility as either a) a merchant facility or b) a facility that recovers its costs through regulated rates. In the case of a facility owned by more than one entity, to maintain consistency with the statutory directive that “if the zero emission facility is owned by more than one entity, then the quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be the amount of zero emission credits that are generated from the portion of the zero emission facility that is owned by the winning supplier,” this certification shall be based on that individual bidder’s “portion of the zero emission facility” owned by it. (20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)).

¹⁵² ~~The ratio of the emission factor in the facility state to the applicable RTO is used to calibrate the intensity of pollutants being offset by the zero emission facility relative to the level of emissions in the applicable RTO.~~

¹⁵³ ~~The summer rated capacity in megawatts for each PJM and MISO nuclear facility and the calculated average are in Appendix D.~~

¹⁵⁴ ~~The facility 10 year average capacity factor is provided by the bidder in the bidder eligibility form (Appendix F).~~

~~The Facility Size Metric = (the facility summer rated capacity in megawatts from the form in Appendix F)/(the average summer rated capacity for nuclear units in the applicable RTO in megawatts)~~

~~The~~ The score for NO_x, SO₂, PM_{2.5} and PM₁₀ equals the Emission Scoring Metric (for each emission criterion) = (state pollutant **Emission Factor** for the emission criterion in pounds per megawatt hour)/(MISO or PJM pollutant average **Emission Factor** for the emission criterion in pounds per megawatt hour)

~~The Emissions Scoring Weight = For NO_x, SO₂, PM_{2.5}, and PM₁₀ the percent of time the wind blows from the direction of the replacement generation sources; and for CO₂ the MISO and PJM-specific ratios for Illinois and non-Illinois facilities.~~

~~Score for each emissions criterion = Facility 10-year average Capacity Factor * Facility Size Metric * Emission Scoring Metric * the Emissions Scoring Weight * Maximum~~ times the maximum points for the ~~emission criteri~~ relevant pollutant.¹⁵⁵

The CO₂ score is equal to the CO₂ Emission Scoring Metric times 25.

The facility's total score, the sum of the ~~five~~ emissions criteria, is ~~then multiplied by the Risk-based Multiplier and~~ then multiplied by the Economic Stress Multiplier to provide the **Final Public Interest Criteria Score**. The **Final Public Interest Criteria Score** will be used to determine which facilities are selected as winning bidders.

Appendix E provides the ~~Excel model with formulas intact used to evaluate zero emission facility bids.~~ proposed bid scoring calculations. All inputs, formulas and results will be reviewed and updated by the Agency and Procurement Administrator following the methodology outlined in this Plan, as ultimately approved by the Commission.

¹⁵⁵ Maximum ~~points~~ scoring is 25 points each for CO₂, NO_x, and SO₂, and 12.5 points each for PM_{2.5} and PM₁₀. ~~In the event that the facility size metric is greater than one, individual emission scores may exceed the maximum score of 25 points.~~

6 Procurement Process Administration

The ZEC procurement goals and procedural requirements for the ZEC procurement process are described in subsection (d-5) of the Act. As described in Chapter 3, to the extent not expressly described in the statute, the IPA understands that the procurement process should be conducted consistent with Section 16-111.5 of the Public Utilities Act, as the process is to be conducted “in conjunction with” that Section.¹⁵⁶ Appendix G contains a summary of the provisions related to the procurement process contained in Section 16-111.5 and their applicability, inapplicability, or need for modification.

One difference between the procurement of ZECs versus the IPA’s prior competitive procurement processes for energy or renewable energy resources (including RECs) is that the selection of winning bids previously involved “...a procedure for sealed, binding commitment bidding with pay-as-bid settlement, and provision for selection of bids on the basis of price.”¹⁵⁷ That bid selection process was also guided by the establishment of market-based price benchmark.¹⁵⁸ Alternatively, bidding for zero emission credit contracts involves the evaluation and selection of bids based on applying ~~the~~ public interest criteria ~~which are~~ focused on the amount of emissions that each bidding zero emission facility can avoid if the facility remains in operation. Therefore, unlike the previous IPA procurements, a price benchmark and bid selections based on competitive bid prices are not applicable to this procurement.

6.1 Bidder Qualification

Owners/operators of zero emission facilities interested in becoming bidders must also submit to the IPA an acceptable form of the eligibility information ~~presented~~ delineated in the Act.¹⁵⁹ While nuclear units at a multiple unit site can be operated independently, nuclear utilities usually operate nuclear plants on a site basis rather than as individual units. However, specific units at many multi-unit sites can have different levels of financial performance related to different output levels and different capacity factors.¹⁶⁰ The IPA proposes to request the zero emission facility information on an individual unit basis to evaluate and score the ZEC bids received. For the purposes of this procurement, each generating unit at a multi-reactor site will be considered individually. Registration as a qualified bidder is contingent on submittal and acceptance by the IPA of the

¹⁵⁶ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C-5).

¹⁵⁷ 220 ILCS 5/16-111.5(e)(3).

¹⁵⁸ ~~Ibid~~ Id.

¹⁵⁹ See 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(A)(i-iv) for the eligibility information required under the law.

¹⁶⁰ Szilard, R. et. al. “Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet,” Energy Systems Strategic Assessment Institute, Center for Advanced Energy Studies, Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear, Idaho National Laboratory, September 2016, INL/EXT-16-39951.

eligibility information. A draft template for submitting the required eligibility information is attached as Appendix F to this Plan to help potential bidders prepare for this submittal.

The IPA is seeking to obtain the completed eligibility information submissions within 14 days of the Commission's approval of this Plan. Those zero emission facilities that intend to participate in the procurement shall submit to the IPA complete templates that include the following eligibility information for each zero emission facility:

- The in-service date and remaining useful life of the zero emission facility;
- The amount of power generated annually for each of the years 2005 through 2015, and the projected ZECs to be generated over the remaining useful life of the zero emission facility, which shall be used to determine the capability of each facility;
- The annual zero emission facility cost projections, expressed on a per MWh basis, over the next 6 delivery years, which shall include the following:
 - Operation and maintenance expenses;
 - Fully allocated overhead costs, which shall be allocated using the methodology developed by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations;
 - Fuel expenditures;
 - Non-fuel capital expenditures;
 - Spent fuel expenditures;
 - A return on working capital;
 - The cost of operational and market risks that could be avoided by ceasing operation; and
 - Any other costs necessary for continued operations, provided that "necessary" means, for purposes of this item, that the costs could reasonably be avoided only by ceasing operations of the zero emission facility; and
- A commitment to continue operating, for the duration of the contract or contracts executed under the procurement, the zero emission facility that produces the ZECs to be procured in the procurement.

These items are all specifically mandated ~~in~~by Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(A). In addition to these specific items, the Agency will require that interested bidders also provide a detailed narrative walkthrough that explains the source and rationale of the assumptions and calculations used to support each specific cost projection ~~item~~item.

The Act, in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(A), provides that cost projection information may be submitted to the IPA on a confidential basis, which the IPA will then treat and maintain as confidential.

“The information described in item (iii) of this subparagraph (A) may be submitted on a confidential basis and shall be treated and maintained by the Agency, the procurement administrator, and the Commission as confidential and proprietary and exempt from disclosure under subparagraphs (a) and (g) of paragraph (1) of Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act. The Office of Attorney General shall have access to, and maintain the confidentiality of, such information pursuant to Section 6.5 of the Attorney General Act.”

The IPA will review the Eligibility Information received and within 14 days notify applicants of any deficiencies in their submittal and they will have 14 days to provide additional information to cure those deficiencies.

6.2 Procurement Process

Subsequent to this Plan’s approval by the Commission, the Agency’s Procurement Administrator will release a schedule for the procurement event, and will develop, in conjunction with the Agency, utilities, ICC Staff, and the Procurement Monitor, draft contracts and release them for comment (See Section 6.4 below). Assuming that there are no delays created by requests for rehearing, complications in the contract development process, or other items outside of the Agency’s direct control, the Agency estimates that the bid date will be in December 2017.

Section 4.5 specifies that the total ZEC target for this procurement is 20,118,672 ZECs to be delivered annually, or 201,186,720 ZECs over the ten-year life of the Zero Emission Standard contracts. Given the “lumpiness” in the output of zero emission facilities, it is unlikely that the total amount of ZECs ~~selected through the selection of~~ produced by winning facilities in the procurement will perfectly match that number. The quantity of ~~ZEC bids~~ ZECs bid is the unit’s projected ZECs to be generated over the remaining useful life of the zero emission facility, or the term of the zero emission program, whichever is shorter.

As described in Chapter 5, bids will be evaluated based upon each facility’s Final Public Interest Criteria Score (the number of points awarded to each facility), with more points resulting in a more highly rated bid. Selected bids will be the bids up to where the last bid is the marginal bid that meets the overall ZEC procurement quantity. ~~For the non-marginal bids (e.g., those where the cumulative volume is less than the ZEC procurement target) the resulting contract will be for the total amount of ZECs bid, while for the marginal bid, the resulting contract will be only for the marginal amount. Note however, that this only applies to the contract value, the actual quantity of ZECs delivered from the unit may higher or lower based on the unit’s actual output. The Act requires that,~~ subject to the 50% requirement explained further in Section 3.3 above.

~~“The quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be all of the zero emission credits generated by the zero emission facility in each delivery year; however, if the zero emission facility is owned by more than one entity, then the quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be the amount of zero emission credits that are generated from the portion of the zero emission facility that is owned by the winning supplier.”⁺⁶⁺~~

For the facilities that are selected as winning bidders, once the procurement results are approved by the Commission, and contracts entered into with all three utilities, the facilities will be treated equally for the purposes of ongoing contract administration. Specifically, the actual ZEC payments made each year will be reduced proportionately, if necessary, across all contracts in order to meet any cost cap limitations. ~~The purpose of this provision is to recognize that while the scores each facility received in the bidding process reflect the extent to which the bidding facility maximizes the public interest criteria for selecting facilities, once the procurement process is complete and facilities selected and remain in operation, each individual ZEC has the same impact on the ongoing realization of the goals of the public interest criteria as any other ZEC and therefore each facility that is delivering ZECs should be treated equally.~~

Under Section 16-111.5(f), the Agency’s procurement process includes the provision that the Procurement Administrator provide to the Commission a confidential report on the recommended winning bids within two business days of the bid date (and concurrently on a confidential basis the Procurement Monitor also provide a separate report on their assessment of the procurement), and the Commission would have two more business days to accept, or reject, those recommendations. However, for the purposes of this procurement, the IPA believes that it may be appropriate to modify that timeline to take into account the additional time that may be needed by the Commission to be able to produce the “public notice” given the non-price selection criteria to be applied to the ZEC bids described in the following section.

6.3 Commission Approval of Procurement Results

The Commission’s decision approving the procurement results and the release of the public notice of successful bidders will occur at a Commission meeting subsequent to the bid date. Contracts between successful bidders and the utilities will then be executed within three business days of that decision. The Agency, in consultation with the Procurement Administrator, the ICC Staff, and the Procurement Monitor may adjust these dates as needed.

Under the IPA’s traditional competitive procurement process, upon the Commission’s approval of procurement results in procurement events conducted under Section 16-111.5, “[t]he names of the successful bidders and the load weighted average of the winning bid prices for each contract type

⁺⁶⁺ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) (emphasis added)

and for each contract term” are required to be “made available to the public at the time of Commission approval of a procurement event,” with other bidder and supplier information is considered “confidential.”¹⁶² Section 1-75(d-5) of the IPA Act requires a different and more (publicly) thorough approach, and envisions the Commission issuing detailed findings explaining its affirmation of the selection of winning bids. Specifically, for the procurement of ZECs, the Commission must release a “public notice” in which it must:¹⁶³

(i) identify how the winning bids satisfy the public interest bid selection criteria described in the law (i.e., minimizing carbon dioxide emissions that result from electricity consumed in Illinois and minimizing sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter emissions that adversely affect the citizens of this State);

(ii) specifically address how the selection of winning bids takes into account the incremental environmental benefits resulting from the procurement, including any existing environmental benefits that are preserved by the procurements held under this Act and that would have ceased to exist if the procurements had not been held, including the preservation of zero emission facilities;

(iii) quantify the environmental benefit of preserving the resources identified in item (ii), including the following:

(aa) the value of avoided greenhouse gas emissions measured as the product of the zero emission facilities' output over the contract term multiplied by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency eGrid subregion carbon dioxide emission rate and the U.S. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon's price in the August 2016 Technical Update using a 3% discount rate, adjusted for inflation for each delivery year; and

(bb) the costs of replacement with other zero carbon dioxide resources, including wind and photovoltaic, based upon the simple average of the following:¹⁶⁴

(I) the price, or if there is more than one price, the average of the prices, paid for renewable energy credits from new utility-scale wind projects in the procurement events specified in the “initial forward procurements” for new wind generation; and

(II) the price, or if there is more than one price, the average of the prices, paid for renewable energy credits from new utility-scale solar projects and brownfield site photovoltaic projects in the procurement events specified in this Act and, after January 1,

¹⁶² 220 ILCS 5/16-111.5(h).

¹⁶³ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C), (C-5).

¹⁶⁴ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(c)(1)(G)(i), (ii).

2015, renewable energy credits from photovoltaic distributed generation projects in procurement events held under the “initial forward procurements” for new solar and the IPA’s DG procurements proposed in its 2015, 2016, and 2017 annual procurement plans.

Given the significant amount of information required in the Commission’s public notice, the Commission may need more than the two business days after the receipt of the reports from the Procurement Administrator and the Procurement Monitor that is envisioned in Section 16-111.5(f), and the Agency recommends that the Commission determine the schedule for what it will require to develop the public notice and approve the procurement results.

Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(D) also provides that, following the ZEC procurement event, the Agency shall “calculate the payments to be made under each contract for the next delivery year based on the market price index for that delivery year” and “publish the payment calculations.”¹⁶⁵ The Agency understands that as part of this calculation, the Agency will also determine and publish the annual ZEC Quantity under the ZEC Volume Cap. The Agency expects that it would publish the 2017-2018 delivery year “payment calculations” approximately two weeks after the Commission’s approval of the procurement results. For subsequent delivery years, the payment calculation will be published by May 25th of each year.¹⁶⁶ As discussed in Section 4.4, the Agency will seek to coordinate with ICC Staff, the Procurement Monitor, and the utilities on the preparation of the calculation.

6.4 ZEC Contracts

The Act requires that “each utility shall enter into binding contractual arrangements with the winning suppliers” of ZECs selected in the procurement event.¹⁶⁷ The IPA will not be a party to any contracts executed with the successful bidders selected as the result of the ZEC procurement. The term of the contracts resulting from the IPA’s ZEC procurement process will be 10 years and will follow the applicable provisions outlined in this Plan. The contract forms will be developed in accordance with Section 16-111.5(e)(2) ~~which states’~~ requirement that ~~“The~~ “[t]he procurement administrator, in consultation with the utilities, the Commission, and other interested parties and subject to Commission oversight, shall develop and provide standard contract forms

¹⁶⁵ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(D). This subparagraph also provides that “[t]he Agency shall publish the payment calculations no later than May 25, 2017 and every May 25 thereafter.” As the ZEC procurement event did not occur by May 25, 2017, the Agency is adjusting its deadline for the 2017-2018 delivery as discussed further above, but intends to publish ZEC payment calculations by May 25 in subsequent years.

¹⁶⁶ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(D).

¹⁶⁷ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1)(C-5).

for the supplier contracts that meet generally accepted industry practices.”¹⁶⁸ Interested parties will be given an opportunity to provide comments on draft contracts. In developing the standard contract forms, the procurement administrator may, in consultation with the utilities, rely on the standard credit instruments developed for previous energy and REC procurements. As specified in Section 16-1115(e)(2), if there is no consensus on the contracts, then “the procurement administrator must notify the Commission of any disputed terms and the Commission shall resolve the dispute.”¹⁶⁹ Should there be a dispute related to the contract terms that must be resolved by the Commission, then the expectation described in Section 6.2 that the bid date will be in December will likely have to be modified to allow the Commission additional time to resolve the contested issue or issues.

6.4.1 Contract Suspension or Termination

The Act, in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(E)(i-iv), specifies the conditions under which a zero emission facility can suspend or terminate performance under a contract executed as the result of the IPA’s ZEC procurement. Those conditions are generally summarized as follows:

- Standard force majeure conditions that are outside of the control of the zero emission facility as described in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(D)(ii).
- The zero emission facility can terminate its ZEC contract in the event legislation is enacted by the General Assembly that “...imposes or authorizes a new tax, special assessment, or fee on the generation of electricity, the ownership or leasehold of a generating unit, or the privilege or occupation of such generation, ownership, or leasehold of generation units by a zero emission facility.”
- The zero emission facility can terminate its contract if the facility requires capital expenditures of more than \$40 million that were unknown or unforeseeable at the time it executed the ZEC contract and which a prudent owner or operator would not undertake.
- The zero emission facility can terminate its ZEC contract if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission terminates the facility’s operating license.

The contracts for the procurement will contain terms to recognize these conditions.

6.4.2 Six Year Review of Actual ZEC Payments

Under Section 1-75(d-5)(3), the IPA is directed to determine, six years after the execution of a ZEC contract or at the termination of a contract, whether the actual payments under the contract

¹⁶⁸ 220 ILCS 5/16-111.5(e)(2).

¹⁶⁹ Id.

exceed the Average ZEC payment defined as “...the Average ZEC Payment shall be calculated by multiplying the quantity of zero emission credits delivered under the contract times the average contract price.”¹⁷⁰ The Act also states “~~If~~ that “[i]f the Agency determines that the actual zero emission credit payments received by the supplier over the relevant period exceed the Average ZEC Payment, then the supplier shall credit the difference back to the utility.”¹⁷¹ The contracts described in this section will contain provisions to account for this potential credit.

6.5 Tracking ZECs

ZECs will be created and tracked utilizing the Generation Attribute Tracking System (“GATS”) operated by PJM.¹⁷² GATS is one of the tracking systems used to track RECs. It tracks all generating facilities in PJM, and can also track systems located outside of PJM that choose to register in GATS. The specific type of Certificate/Credit to be used is the “Emission Free Energy Certificates²,” and that certificate type is already part of the GATS system.

The GATS Operating Rules¹⁷³ define an Emission Free Energy Certificate as a “Certificate from a generating unit that produces Emission-Free Energy.” The Operating Rules define “Emissions-Free Energy” as “Electric power output from a generating unit that does not directly produce any air emissions (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, or carbon dioxide) as reported in the GATS system. Eligible fuel types include new and existing: Solar Photovoltaic, Solar Thermal, Wind, Hydro, Nuclear, Tidal Energy and Wave Energy.”¹⁷⁴

Zero Emission Credits as defined in Section 1-10 of the IPA Act must come from a Zero Emission Facility, which is “(1) is fueled by nuclear power; and (2) is interconnected with PJM Interconnection, LLC or the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., or their successors.” Therefore, Zero Emission Credits are a subset of Emission Free Energy Certificates. Emission Free Energy Certificates from facilities that do not meet the definition of a Zero Emission Facility (e.g., facilities that are photovoltaics, wind, or hydro) will not be eligible for this procurement.

Transactions will be governed by the GATS Operating Rules. Successful zero emission facility sellers will deliver and convey to each utility all rights and title to their contractual volume of

¹⁷⁰ The average contract price is determined by subtracting the average of the market price indices as defined in Section 1-75(d-5)(1)(B) during the term of the contract less the baseline market price from the average of the Social Cost of Carbon during the term of the contract.

¹⁷¹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(3).

¹⁷² See: gats.pjm-eis.com

¹⁷³ See www.pjm-eis.com/~media/pjm-eis/documents/gats-operating-rules.ashx

¹⁷⁴ Id.

ZECs for each contract executed with the respective utility. ~~ZECs will be retired by each utility following conveyance to the utility and after acceptance and payment for the ZECs by the utility. In circumstances where there is an unpaid contractual volume, those ZECs will not be retired until such time as they are paid for in a subsequent delivery year. The IPA invites interested parties to comment on if unpaid contractual volume ZECs should be retired in this way, or if they should be retired upon delivery to the utility regardless of if the ZECs are part of an unpaid contractual volume.~~ As the Zero Emission Standard requires that “[t]he quantity of zero emission credits to be procured under the contracts shall be all of the zero emission credits generated by the zero emission facility in each delivery year,”¹⁷⁵ and as the law requires that the electric utilities “retire all zero emission credits used to comply with the requirements of this subsection (d-5),”¹⁷⁶ all ZECs (including unpaid contractual volumes) will be retired by each utility following conveyance to the utility.

¹⁷⁵ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(1).

¹⁷⁶ 20 ILCS 3855/1-75(d-5)(5).